The Policy of Immigration and Naturalization in Russia: Present State and Prospects

Abstract

Prepared by the Eurasia Heritage Foundation and the Centre for Strategic Studies of the Volga Federal District

March 2006

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Editor: Sergei Gradirovsky

Moscow
PART 1. THE TRENDS

Migration flows and naturalization of the aliens in Russia: historical overview

Historically, Russia has always been a country closed to foreigners. That’s why the population exchanges with other countries did not happen spontaneously, but only at “the Czar’s will”. The most widely known examples of Their Highnesses’ benevolence, to name just a few, are:

— invitation of German Mennonites to colonize the newly acquired lands of Novorossia in the late 18th — 19th centuries;

— permission given to some groups of the Balkan Orthodox nations (the Greeks, Serbians, and Bulgarians) to settle down within certain areas of the Russian Empire in the 19th century;


However, more often aliens acquired citizenship of the Russian Empire along with its spatial expansion: the Finns, Poles, Georgians, Moldavians, Adzharians, Azeri, Armenians, Kazakhs, and nations of Central Asia used to become the Empire’s nationals without changing their usual place of residence. Together with the new status they gained unprecedented mobility and prospects to migrate beyond the borders of their native lands throughout the entire Russia.

The authors of the report point to the specific nature of the Russian nation-state formation — through the policies of incorporation and naturalization — in various historical periods that features the flexibility of the state policies as to the “strange” territories and populations within the Empire:

— in the 13th–16th centuries, over one third of Russia’s nobility were of Tartar descent;

— neither own language nor religious contradictions and Islam in particular turned able to obstruct the positive complementarity¹ of the Slavic and Turkic ethnic groups;

— in the 16th–18th centuries, the Finno-Ugric and Turkic nations of the European North, Volga basin, Urals, and Siberia were integrating into the state and society both through their cultural and linguistic assimilation as well as conversion to Orthodox faith and through naturalization that vested them with all the rights and responsibilities of the ethnic Russian nationals;

— in the 18th century, the peoples of the Baltic provinces were to various degrees assimilated by the Germans, Swedes, Poles, but not by the Empire’s dominant nation — the Russians;

— in 1809, with annexation of Finland, the Finns were exempt from duties and taxes, which were obligatory for the rest of the Empire’s nationals, while the Russians themselves were in fact treated in Finland like foreigners;

— the Empire’s authorities decided to give up the complete naturalization of the Northern Caucasus nations since Russia’s civil and legal systems were simply unable to incorporate them at the time;

— in the second half of the 19th century, while incorporating the territory of Central Asia and today’s Kazakhstan, there were no attempts made to naturalize the indigenous populations and to extend on them the terms and norms of the all-Russian legislation.

¹ The special term “complementarity” was first introduced by the Russian philosopher Leo Gumiliov according to whom it means “the subconscious feeling of mutual sympathy (or antipathy – in case of negative complementarity) that allows members of different ethnic groups to recognize “theirs own” and aliens”. Now, in addition to its original meaning, that term also defines the ability of different ethnic groups to co-exist peacefully as a result of the conscious efforts to get on with each other, either in social or business (commercial) terms.
In the early 19th century, the nature of Russian colonization started to change fundamentally because of two basic reasons: after having expanded the Empire’s sovereignty into the vast regions of the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan, Russians stepped beyond their usual landscape borders. They crossed their natural habitat frontiers and thus confronted ethnic groups with completely different cultural and historical traditions, and often with negative complementarity. As a result, the territories and nations acquired by the Russian Empire during different historical periods were granted a different political, administrative, and civil status. From the administrative and legal point of view the Empire developed into an intricate mosaic of lands and peoples.

Abdication of Nicholas II heralded a new approach to the naturalization policy. It was the Interim Government that had the honor of granting all former nationals of the abolished, but not ceased to exist Empire, equal civil rights.

During the Soviet period, the colonization program was significantly renewed. Industrial, scientific, engineering and managerial qualifications came to the fore instead of “labor skills of the Russian peasantry”. A large-scale industrialization, the revolution in science and technologies as well as the enthusiasm of the new Soviet nation made it possible to go on with further colonization of the former Empire’s outskirts, though on a completely different basis.

Until the mid-1940s, the need for economic growth of the USSR’s Eastern regions determined the principal directions of the population flows (to the great extent these were forced movements of the imprisoned, deported or expelled). After World War II, the Russian republic (RSFSR) became the major migration donor for Kazakh and other non-Slavic republics of the USSR, which experienced rapid economic progress caused by intensive industrialization.

The situation began to change at the turn of the 1960-70s when the Russian SFSR started to become the recipient of the population flows from the other Soviet republics; since then and up until now it still has a positive balance of migration.

The emigration flows have always had quite different spatial layout:

— colonization of the remote Southern and Eastern regions by Russian peasants, Cossacks and Old Believers (after the 17th century schism) often outstripped the incorporation of these lands into the Russian state, and so the state was “catching up” with its former subjects who attempted to escape its oppressions; and then the new lands became the part of the Empire together with the earlier emigrants’ descendants;

— migration history of the 19th century sets the standard of the voluntary-forced movements: just this way, secretly stimulated by the Russian governors, the Adyghei tribes of the Northwestern Caucasus left the country followed by the Crimean Tartars and Nogai people who emigrated in several consecutive waves — after the Crimea’s annexation in the late 18th century and after the Eastern (Crimean) War in the mid-19th century;

— one of the most important emigration events in the entire Russian history started in the 19th century and went on in the 20th century: the population movement to the Americas. The majority of the emigrants heading for North American shores were the Jews from the Empire’s Western regions;

— as estimated, from 2 to 5 million emigrants left the former Empire after the Civil War of 1917–1921.

After “the iron curtain” had dropped there were actually no opportunities left for the USSR citizens to emigrate. Migration developed an exclusively domestic character. Demolition of the former social hierarchy and restrictions based on the ethnic origins, introduction of the formally equal civil and political rights — the new Soviet national policy in all possible ways promoted the rapid integration as well as social and cultural assimilation of the non-Russian
populations of the former Empire’s outskirts. However, whereas Soviet authorities managed to find legal solutions to the naturalization problems quite easily, their policy aimed at complete elimination of ethnic differences and standardization of the USSR populations’ lifestyles has in fact failed. Moreover, its negative consequences manifested themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Second half of the 20th century in retrospect

The central event of the second half of the 20th century, which has had a considerable impact on present-day Russia, is the end of the centuries-long colonization trend and its replacement by the so called “Western Drift” phenomenon.

During the last seven centuries the population movements in Russia had a centrifugal character — mostly northward, eastward and southward. However, already in the 1960s this process stopped being that straightforward. It is just that time heralded a new era of Russia’s demographics: in 1964 the net reproduction rate dropped below 1.0 — since then, except for a short period of 1986-88, it has remained at the same level. With that, the male death rates have started to increase and this growth is still in progress. Additionally, the re-colonization manifested itself: Russians started to gradually return to the territories that for centuries used to generate the waves of Russian colonization.

The beginning of the 1970s in the USSR was a turning point regarding the directions of population flows: the inflow to the South of the country started to decrease rapidly while flows directed to the Russia’s North and East were increasing. At the same time the Southern regions of the USSR saw the population outflow. A bit later this process was named “the repatriation of the Russians”. Since the mid-1970s, the direction of the population flows within the former USSR has finally changed its vector: following the republics of the Trans-Caucasus the process of the outflow of the ethnic Russian and the Russian-speaking populations has spread over the republics of Central Asia. The development programs of the 1970s, especially in the oil and gas sector (Western Siberia) and the construction of the BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline) became the “swan song” of the planned colonization.

In the 1980s, the Kazakh and Moldavian republics were involved in the repatriation movement. As a result, in 1975–1990, the inflow from the other Soviet republics accounted for 2.64 million contribution to the population growth in the Russian SFSR.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its socialist economic system in 1991, the population hurried to leave the Northern regions where the state was no longer able to provide for decent living. The decay of social infrastructure in many cities and villages and a real threat of unemployment added to the above. Those originated from the former Soviet republics (Ukrainian and Belorussian in particular) set off for their “national flats” in fear of losing the reserved real estate there and retirement benefits.

Meanwhile, migrants found the Central and Southwestern regions of the country to be attractive. These regions were facing the inflow of the repatriates and refugees as well as the officers and servicemen from the disbanded military units.

Current trends: 1990–2005

After the burst of the early 1990s, migration within the former Soviet Union started to cease. Much like the fact of the decreasing immigration in the Russian Federation, it demonstrated a new trend: transformation of the population movements’ nature into the temporary (and) labor migration. The factors that stimulated migration to Russia from the neighboring countries are as follows: the war in Chechnya (1994-96), the 1998 financial and economic crisis, growing difficulties in the residence registration, xenophobia / mass phobias as to the migrants within the Russian society, and the general improvement of the situation in the post-Soviet countries. Despite that, as from 1994 to 2004 Russia saw the immigration increase from all the countries of the CIS and the Baltic states with the exception of Belarus.
According to current migration data, 67 per cent of Russia’s migration growth in the population exchange with the other former Soviet republics between 1989 and 2004 was accounted for by the ethnic Russians. Nevertheless, the share of the Russians in the migration growth of Russia’s population is decreasing due to shrinking Russian diasporas in many CIS countries, the decrease of its migration potential and the overall drop of Russia’s migration attractiveness for the former USSR populations. The latter is to a great extent determined by the mode of interaction with former compatriots in the Russian Federation.

The most complementary migrants, the ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking in the CIS countries and the Baltic states, are ageing fast. There are less children and youngsters in the flows from the CIS. The current structure of the registered immigration cannot improve the age structure of the Russian population, and in case this structure stays on the overall ageing of Russia’s population would deteriorate. The rejuvenation of population inflows may only be achieved at the expense of ethnic composition changes, i.e. increase of the share of the Central Asia natives.

Until most recently, both immigrants and emigrants have had a higher level of education on average compared to that of Russia’s natives. However, it’s only possible to compare the formal parameters of the migrants’ educational attainments and these do not always reflect their actual qualifications and competence. Thus the quality of the educational and professional skills is still to be questioned. Nominally, the migration from the CIS countries brings to Russia more educated people than those from the far-abroad. However, it is mostly due to the older structure of the post-Soviet migration flows. The share of young people whose education is not yet completed is higher in the emigration flow. In 2004, persons under 30 accounted for almost 40 per cent among university / college graduates as well as those with some university / college who left the country.

Since 1995, emigration has steadily declined. Just once, after the 1998 financial and economic crisis, its rate grew for a short while. By the late 1990s, the share of ethnic Russians in the emigration flow has grown from 24 per cent in 1993 to 46 per cent in 2004. Emigration from Russia becomes more and more elitist: more often people are leaving the country not because of their ethnicity (and thus expecting further support from the host countries), but in the search for a more productive (and highly paid) employment, education and vocational training. There is business emigration, too. As to the “brain drain”, if in the early 1990s the primary concern was on the emigration of outstanding professors and researchers including those famous worldwide (that led to the degradation of some national research schools), nowadays the main concern are the graduates and students of prestigious educational institutions as well as young Russians who complete their studies in Western universities and then prefer to stay there. During the last 15 years about 25 thousand Russian researchers left the country forever and another 30 thousand are leaving Russia annually to work abroad on a temporary contract basis.

According to various estimates, in 1989-2004, over 1.2 million people emigrated from Russia. Moreover, the data from the Russian migration principal recipient countries shows even higher numbers (at least +20%).

The movement of people within Russia has had a strong impact on the country’s population numbers and composition. In 1989-2004, the registered domestic movements involved 46.5 million people. Because of that the country’s Northern and Eastern regions experienced essential decrease in the population numbers during the last 15 years. The main feature that manifested itself in that period is the so called “Western Drift”, which re-directed principal flows to the West thus changing the usual model of the territorial distribution of population in Russia. The population is now concentrating in the Central, Volga, and Southern Federal Districts whereas other regions suffer great losses. The pole of the population outflow is formed by the Sakha Yakutia, Magadan region, Chukotka Autonomous District, Sakhalin and Kamchatka regions with Koriak Autonomous District. The southern regions of the Far East
were unable to preserve their own populations and they also failed to attract their Northern neighbors.

Table 1.1. Population exchanges between the federal districts (1991–2003, thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the course of exchange with the federal district</th>
<th>Net gain / loss by the federal district</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia, total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia, total</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-862.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>135.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>-245.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ural</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberian</td>
<td>267.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-Eastern</td>
<td>752.7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data on the migration current record (the Russian State Statistics Committee — RosStat)

The movement of people from rural areas to cities is the second (along with interregional movements) general trend. For many decades rural areas were providing human resources for cities not only in Russia, but in the entire former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the process reversed for a short while: in 1992–93, for the first time since World War II, the cities experienced a loss of population. Such was the reaction to a stressful situation: economic crisis, every-day life expenses soaring, and a threat of unemployment. The urbanization crisis was a heavy blow to the cities of the Russia’s European North, Siberia and the Urals. There, the inversion of the urbanization trend manifested itself even earlier, in 1990–91, and it was mainly due to that very flow that the villages of the central and southern Russia were replenished with newcomers. The recovery of the urbanization trend in 1994 took place at a much lower level than in the decades before. The reason is an essential drop in the demographic potential of rural areas and the decreased spatial mobility\(^2\) of rural population.

Another recent trend is quite unusual for Russia: some segment of the city residents prefer to migrate to rural areas which is especially essential for the big cities’ suburbs. Today, one fifth of all Russians, 29 million people, live “between village and city”.

There are no reliable estimates for the volume of unregistered immigration. Officials estimate it in the 1.5 million to 15 million range, but experts tend to think there are 3-4 million temporary migrant workers from the CIS countries in the Russian Federation at a time. No less than 1 million labor migrants arrive from Ukraine, another 200-300 thousand — from Moldova. Labor migration from the Trans-Caucasian states does not generally exceed 1.5 million people. The Central Asian component of the labor migration is becoming more noticeable. Of the other countries China might be singled out: the number of Chinese migrant workers in Russia is estimated at 250-400 thousand at a time.

In the first half of the 1990s, migration made up for the losses caused by the country’s depopulation (in some years the migration even overcompensated for the losses), but since the second half of the 1990s the compensatory role of migration in Russia is diminishing. That wasn’t noticed right away: the stress migrations of the previous years have taught the Russian

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\(^2\) The authors of the report make special distinctions between spatial (purely in geographical terms), social (directly correlated with the property qualifications development), professional (mobility between jobs), and academic (mobility of students, teachers, and researchers) mobility.
authorities and entire society to consider immigration only as the social problem. Its economic, demographic, and geopolitical effects are still not obvious to the country’s leaders.


In fact, during the 1990s, Russia enjoyed the status of being the second most attractive country for migrants: in terms of the average annual volumes of net migration only the US left it behind. If not for migration growth in those years, since the last Soviet census of 1989, the population of Russia would have dropped not by 1.8 million, but by 7.4 million, and by 2003 it would be less than 140 million.

Though depopulation has been Russia’s harsh reality since 1992, the country has not yet experienced a decrease in its labor force. Moreover, due to favorable demographics, the working age population is currently growing. However, from 2007 on, the shortage of people will be ever felt not only in the kindergartens and primary schools, but also in the universities, army, labor market… Actually, mass immigration is the only way to overcome the negative effects of the country’s depopulation and to slow down rapid population decline.

Future prospects are such that, with low immigration and rather limited resources for the population redistribution at the expense of internal movements, the human resources of the entire country would hardly be enough to sustain at the present level the labor force and population size of the Central Federal District. In order to considerably slow down the process of population decline in Russia’s Eastern regions the country needs higher levels (compared to the current official records) of immigration activity.

Migration projections up to 2020

The authors of the report won’t ever, even hypothetically, accept the idea of Russia being closed for international migration in the new century. And there are several reasons for that.

The Russian Federation is steadily striving for integration with the former Soviet republics within the regional structures such as the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Common Economic Space, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the like. Integration is hardly possible without the labor resources exchange; therefore it also requires an intensive
demographic (migration) exchange. In certain circumstances Russia would greatly benefit from the open common labor market.

Outside Russia there are still millions of former compatriots; on the other hand, millions of the CIS countries natives are already living in Russia. Many Russian citizens have close relatives abroad and thus the population exchange between the former Soviet republics, which has declined recently, will inevitably intensify as economies start to grow and contacts begin to liven up again.

Inevitably, Russia will continue to face demographic pressures from China, the Trans-Caucasian republics, countries of Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Vietnam, etc. This situation is neither unique nor exceptional — it is just a macroregional case of the worldwide migratory pressures produced by the overpopulated developing countries. Such situations will last as long as the countries of the South and North remain at different stages of global demographic transition.

While expanding eastwards, the European Union will experience the ever growing need for labor, so we’ll inevitably witness the countries of Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Russia in particular, becoming major migration donors for the EU. Therefore we should expect growing emigration, especially of the younger generation, and further depopulation of the country. Hence, our own need for replacement migration could only grow with the time.

Russia’s own demographic resources for population and labor force redistribution are extremely scarce and almost drained. The entire Federation is just now able to satisfy the needs of the two capital metropolitan areas (Moscow and St.-Petersburg) and the regions of the country’s European South. With no immigration, the Trans-Urals and Siberia are doomed to lose their populations even at a higher rate than in the 1990s.

The current immigration and emigration rates aren’t just insufficient, but disproportionately too small for a country that is in fact open, so sparsely populated, and in constant need for extra labor.

The authors of the report consider several migration projections.

The low variant — the inertial one — is based on the assumption of the migration balance stabilizing at the level of 2001–03. This variant supposes two scenarios, which depend on the calculation base: (a) the data on the current records only (surely incomprehensive) or (b) the 2002 Census data on migration (it must be said that correction based on the Census data has considerably raised immigration parameters).

The high variant — the target one — is based on the assumption of the immigration increasing to the level that would ensure net migration of 400 thousand working age people annually by 2010 and up to 600 thousand working age people annually by 2020.

**Low variant 1** means average balance of migration totaling 85 thousand annually.

**Low variant 2** means average balance of migration totaling 317 thousand annually.

**The high variant** is based on the expected hypothetical growth in the numbers of arrivals and departures by 9–10 per cent during 2004–10, with further decrease of the growth rate to 6 per cent, and then to 1 per cent in 2020.

In this case the average balance of migration will amount to 632 thousand annually, by 2010 it will reach 577 thousand and by 2020 — 854 thousand; the average number of new arrivals will amount to 790 thousand annually. As a result, the Russia’s working age population will be steadily growing by 442 thousand per year on the average.
Table 1.2. Cumulative results of the projection variants (2004–20, thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Departures</th>
<th>Net migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low variant, Scenario 1</td>
<td>2909.1</td>
<td>1461.6</td>
<td>1447.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low variant, Scenario 2</td>
<td>6852.4</td>
<td>1461.6</td>
<td>5390.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High variant</td>
<td>14323.1</td>
<td>3580.8</td>
<td>10742.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART 2. THE EXPERIENCES

The regulation of migration in Russia: institutions and legislation

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 accompanied by downfall of the state’s governance and administration systems and respective legal vacuum, for the first time in many decades, Russia faced a relatively large-scale emigration as well as forced migration. However, neither ethnic emigration (i.e. Germans and Jews), nor the “brain drain” (that has been realized to be a real problem much later), nor even the movement of the millions of immigrants who would never expect any assistance from the state (they’ve just spread all over the country) have attracted such attention from the authorities as the problem of refugees and displaced persons. Actually, the immigration policy as well as the respective legislation turned out to be entirely determined by the state officials’ attitude towards forced movements.

For the most part, Russia’s immigration policy in the 1990s was regulated by the laws “On Citizenship”, “On Refugees”, “On Displaced Persons” as well as by The Federal Migration Program of 1994. With this, the paternalist policy in respect to refugees and displaced persons based both on the Soviet past and on an attempt to comply with international legal standards, had no distinct objectives anymore. Besides, the role of the state within the welfare system started to transform gradually resulting in the actual failure of the resettlement and adaptation programs. The integration wasn’t on the agenda at all, perhaps because of no actual differences (in the cultural sense) between Russia’s own citizens and those of the other republics of the former USSR. The migration flow consisted mainly of the Russian-speaking people who were bearing the very same Soviet mentality. It seemed then no special integration policy is of any need.

The principal law “On the RSFSR Citizenship” allowed any USSR citizen to get the Russian citizenship upon mere request. By the end of 2000, however, a restrictive character of the naturalization policy manifested itself. Afterwards the naturalization procedures and requirements have been changed several times. Introduction of some extra restrictions coincided with the incoming flow decline that altogether resulted in the considerable drop in the numbers of those granted the Russian citizenship.

As to the legislation in respect to domestic movements, the only law was passed — “On the Rights of the Citizens of the Russian Federation of the Freedom of Movement, the Choice of Residence and Place of Stay within the Russian Federation”. Though it abolished the compulsory residence permit (that meant general obligation to report changes of address to the local department of the Interior Ministry for recording on population registers), the bureaucratic practice managed to keep safe this modern “serfdom”. The registration turned out to become just a euphemism for the residence permit — a reliable instrument of the much hated Soviet policy of massive planned and forced movements. Eventually, the control over population flows was lost. The registration (along with the situation in the residential property market and poor welfare) remained to be the main obstacle to the growth of spatial mobility for both Russia’s citizens and aliens.

In 2002, the Interior Ministry adopted the instruction that obliged all the former USSR citizens permanently residing in the RF to get the residence permit. Then the new, more restrictive, edition of the law “On Citizenship” was passed. As a result, immigration declined rapidly, but an even greater drop in numbers has been registered for the legal flow. Inevitably, illegal
immigration has grown drastically. The immigration policy became de facto prohibitive. Consequently, today only about 10 per cent of migrant workers are staying in Russia legally.

In February 2002, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) became the part of the Interior Ministry that led to some important consequences: the issues of control have grown to be an absolute priority while fighting illegal immigration turned out to be the principal direction of the FMS activity. The main indicator of the Interior Ministry’s achievements — the number of crimes committed — became principal to the Migration Service, too, that inevitably conflicted with the immigration policy’s tasks and goals. National security, so much hyped by power structures, turned out to be in jeopardy because of the very same measures practiced by the Interior Ministry. Too strict rules provoked further growth of the unregistered migrants numbers since people became simply unable to abide by the law even when and if they would wish to. At the same time, the FMS lost its independence in important decision making. For instance, once declared by the Migration Service’s direction “one window registration” and “credit registration” remained just good intentions that were completely ignored by the Interior Ministry’s senior officials.

Meanwhile, the nature of migration from the CIS countries started to change: if during the first half of the 1990s these were mainly forced movements, by the beginning of the new century predominance of the economic (labor) migration has been already obvious. However, the Russian lawmakers did not react to the changes. As a result, labor migrants found themselves completely helpless in legal and social terms. Extreme complications in getting legal status and work permits forced migrant workers to stay and work unregistered in the RF which often meant literal slavery, coarse violation of basic human rights, unbearable living conditions, not to mention any welfare or medical insurance. Lately, these were either NGOs or business associations that made some attempts to render legal assistance to migrant workers, ease their working and living conditions. The business was actually forced to do this since founding itself at a rigid “fork” — between punitive sanctions for hiring illegals and the inability to legally employ the guest workers at the proper time and at a reasonable expense (this refers mainly to small and medium businesses).

The government of the Russian Federation still has no policy regarding migration of highly skilled professionals. At the same time, the impossibility to capitalize on own knowledge and skills, to show one’s worth in research led to qualified specialists moving abroad. Moreover, it launched the reliable mechanism of exporting bright youngsters. Inflow of highly skilled immigrants from the CIS countries could definitely reduce the negative influence of the “brain drain”, but the much needed integration and adaptation programs were not introduced.

Russia’s elite still doesn’t pay enough attention to student migration. In the past it was the solid Soviet ideological basis that backed the entire system of attracting foreign students while the state used to strictly regulate and generously support it. Today, there is no similar institution that is able to manage the student flows. With this, the students are first among the priority immigration categories: they are young, well educated, and usually succeeding in the integration into the host society while studying. The only legal act passed in respect to student immigration is the 2003 amendment to the law “On Citizenship” that eased the procedure of acquiring citizenship for those who got vocational training in the Russian Federation.

Though 334 thousand people became citizens of the Russian Federation in 2004, and the drastic drop of 2003 (38 thousand) seemed to be overcome, there are no signs that the authorities consider new citizens to be a benefit to society. They are still focusing on the negative effects of immigration, though the restrictive nature of the country’s immigration policy prevents it from solving the old problems and responding to the new challenges. Respectively, the policy has failed on the following directions:

1. **Selective approach.** As the USSR’s successor, Russia has inherited a unique resource — well educated, highly skilled and culturally close human inflow from the former Soviet
republics, but failed to take the full advantage of it. The country’s attractiveness for former compatriots is permanently decreasing, and that flow is now being redirected: today, migrants from Ukraine, Moldova, and the Trans-Caucasus prefer more friendly European countries. Russian authorities are just coming to realize this fact, but the “negative selection” mechanism is already in full swing.

2. Displacement and resettlement. In order to regulate the settlement system it is necessary to define prospective types and forms of settlements; to divide the entire country into zones; to identify its spatial framework. Manageable and directed immigration is an investment into the most prospective settlements. Today, there is still a certain threat that actual migration management might slow down the reform of Russia’s settlement framework.

3. Integration and adaptation. Security issues directly depend on migrants’ successful integration into the host society. Power structures and security agencies do not usually go deep into the matter and prefer control to any other measures. However, the extent of the state’s obligations is in fact a political issue that requires definite answers to several questions: Can Russia afford the paternalist policy towards former compatriots? Should the state take upon itself social obligations to the extent that is normal and usual for the EU countries? (It is not a secret today that the Russian government isn’t able to discharge all its social obligations to its own citizens…) Thus the authors of the report suggest sticking to the principle “to be hospitable, but not paternalist”.

4. Naturalization. There are still no answers to some key questions. For instance: which categories of immigrants are of most priority to the state and society, i.e. could pretend to the naturalization procedure to be as simple as only possible? Should priority immigrants be relatively young and with children, but low-skilled, or else well educated and highly qualified, but older? Should a child born within the RF be granted Russian citizenship even if both his/her parents are foreign citizens (i.e. should the Russian Federation legitimize “the right of soil” as the US and France did)?

Migration records: statistical indistinctness

The breakup of the national register system after the USSR’s collapse was rather natural since the Soviet national register proved to be unfit for the new migration situation. Current shortage of information on migration is caused by a number of reasons, and the most important ones are:

— no standardized methods of the crude data collection within the country;
— no open access to the data collected by the Interior Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Border Patrol Service (it is also unclear what particular methods all the mentioned use in data collecting and processing);
— no infrastructure for the registration and coordination of the crude data collection.

The situation with recording migration in Russia today is almost paradoxical since:

— there is enough information for immigration registration, but no processing system established;
— there is processing system to register domestic movements, but no data are being collected systematically;
— authorities are willing to register emigration, but those leaving aren’t motivated to.

Altogether these do not allow making adequate statistical estimations on migration.

The system of statistical recording of citizens, foreigners and apatrides is aimed at certain goals. These particular goals determine the operational typology (classification) of migration, the list of facts about migrants, the categories of individuals to be registered, the extent to what access to both the crude and aggregated data should be open to the public and interested
parties. Today, the power structures are those determining such goals in Russia. The state has in fact given them a *carte blanche*. They are principal users of the information on immigrants while the interests of other bodies and agents of migration policy are not reflected in the current system of statistical records at all.

The authors of the report conclude that the system of recording migration should not just correspond with the basic process of the state and nation building, meet certain functional requirements, but also be varied (the collection of some data should be delegated to several individual agents who have a clear idea of their needs in the field and thus are capable of developing local records systems) and able to keep an integral vision of the data structure and their processing principles.

The need for a system of centralized recording is well realized in many of Russia’s regions. Tired of waiting for proper actions from the federal center, local authorities are now starting, step by step, to create regional migration databases. However, while serving the interests of separate regions such databases are deficient in integration and universal qualities.

**Decrease in incoming flow after 1995: causes and consequences**

There are nine principal causes for the decrease in incoming flow after 1995.

1. The general drop in the numbers of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the CIS and Baltic states that up until now are still the major reservoirs of immigration in the Russian Federation. The drop mentioned is due to, firstly, the Russian and Russian-speaking populations leaving en masse for Russia and other foreign countries; secondly, negative natural growth that aggravates the losses caused by mass emigration; thirdly, ethnic re-identification on the part of those who decided to stay home, i.e. in the CIS and Baltic countries.

2. Though we got into the habit of calling these people “our compatriots”, the state of their minds survives some principal changes. The new generation of people who live outside the Russian Federation has very little interest in Russia: for many Russian-speaking youngsters it is just a very big, but completely unknown neighboring country. Russia has in many respects lost this younger generation to the West and European culture.

3. The “pushing-out” factor doesn’t work in the majority of the CIS and Baltic countries any longer: the processes and actions that some time ago forced ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people to leave are already over or became a norm that does not irritate, but is being accepted as a part of everyday life.

4. The decline in Russia’s economic attractiveness because of the substantial economic growth in the number of donor countries.

5. The decline in Russia’s humanitarian attractiveness (and a steadily high migration attractiveness of Western countries). The contradictory policies and practices of the Russian authorities just aggravate the poor situation. Too often declarations of the country’s vital interest in more immigration are combined with literally Draconian migration laws and anti-migrant rhetoric of some high rank officials. Besides, it is obvious that the number of organizations practicing violence against foreigners is constantly growing, but authorities used to tolerate their activities.

6. For some time, labor migration flows from several post-Soviet countries are being redirected towards the European markets. In the future, the competition between labor markets of Russia and Eastern Europe for labor migrants from the CIS countries will only be growing.

7. The restrictive nature of the immigration legislation in the Russian Federation is accompanied by waves of lawmaking “putting the screws on” and further forced “thaws”. Such “norm-searching” cycle is combined with the bad Russian tradition when quite
reasonable and humane legal innovations turn out to be unequipped with measures of their practical implementation, but are followed by harsh by-laws and departmental instructions.

8. The Russian state has always enforced its laws pro-actively. As a result, any immigrant who intends to abide by the law is involved in a highly bureaucratic and badly organized procedure (that particularly means very limited business hours in the Migration Service’s local offices) accompanied by the lack of responsibility on the part of the officials (say, for inaccurate and late issuance of the documents: the Migration Services’ clerks would rather turn down a request on any pretext, but avoid accepting responsibility for a positive decision).

9. The hostility of the Russian society that in fact has lost the feeling of a single nation.

These causes lead to the following harmful effects:

— ever growing negative influence of the “Western Drift” and further geopolitical tensions in the Far East and Siberia, the economic stagnation in a number of the historical localities (especially within the Volga area) and rapidly ageing regions (the Central and North-Western Federal Districts with the exception of the Moscow and St.-Petersburg metropolitan areas);

— the shortage of demographic resources to sustain the population numbers in the major metropolitan areas (with the exception of Moscow); the inability, even theoretically, to develop highly urbanized centers in the strategic regions (the Primorskiy Kray, Siberia, the Urals);

— the “negative selection” of the incoming flows, which means not the best are choosing Russia as their new home country, but only those who actually have no choice; it also means growing illegal immigration. Thus, it is not just the inflow of poorer quality, but also, in large part, unregistered and therefore uncontrolled and unmanageable. Inevitably, in turn, this leads to the growth of xenophobia that is simply disastrous for such a multiethnic and multireligious country as Russia is.

In combination with a complicated demographic situation the effects mentioned result in growing gaps in the labor markets in a number of industrial sectors and regions. Besides, the age composition of today’s Russian population is such that business should expect a drastic drop in the working age population numbers that could well add to the economic slowdown. In the long run it means a geo-economic defeat in the competition for global and macroregional labor resources.

The authors of the report reasonably expect that, very soon, the Russian government will have to strive for promoting the attractive image of the country to both high and low skilled “nomadic” labor as it does today promoting the country’s investment rank. If not today, then tomorrow, the entire society will have to deal with the issues of considerable investments into recruiting, transfers and integration of the migrant labor into production and socio-cultural niches of such enormously huge and diverse country as Russia is.

Part 3. THE INTENTIONS

Immigration: what for and why?

The principal point of today’s discussions as for the need of a large-scale immigration in Russia is the country’s demographics characterized by a negative natural growth. As a result, the annual population loss amounts for almost 1 million (with no replacement migration). No measures destined to improve high death rates and extremely low birth rates would allow for changing the situation drastically in the observable future.

The population changes are very inertial; besides, there are no preconditions to expect much change in the population reproduction model in Russia, and so the majority of the demographic projections available predict further decrease in population numbers by 2050:
the most optimistic estimates agree on around 120 million while the pessimists talk of no more than 70-80 million.

Thus it is no wonder that the issues of geopolitical prospects of the Russian state including its ethnic and cultural stability as well as defensive capability become of vital importance. The Federation also faces challenges in the strategic spheres of economics, politics and ethnicity, the labor and consumption markets. Russia’s status as a major world power won’t allow it to avoid the questions of human rights and universal humanitarian obligations.

While responding to the challenges and answering the questions the state should take into account both conventional immigration practices and its own future needs and demands.

Obviously, Russia would only be able to slow down (and even stop) its own depopulation if were more attractive for high-quality population flows. Stabilizing the population numbers would minimize the actual risks of loss of territorial integrity. It is possible to stimulate such an inflow by using various instruments of immigration and naturalization policies.

Immigration is a true challenge to Russia’s statehood in the new century. The authors of the report consider possible responses in two ways — as conventional answers and as seen from the point of future needs and demands.

Table 3.1. The features of immigration & naturalization policy: conventional answers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses in the sphere of</th>
<th>Specific features of the policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>geopolitics and defensive capability</td>
<td>promoting the selective, but sufficiently large-scale resettlement; improving the channel of army (military) immigration; creating zones of ethnic diversity in close proximity to mono-cultural regions (i.e. along the Chinese border); encouraging an ethnic diversity program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economics, labor and consumption markets</td>
<td>promoting economic immigration — including both needed skilled or unskilled workers, professionals with advanced degrees or of advanced abilities, entrepreneurs and investors; encouraging the guest workers to consume within the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>culture and ethnicity</td>
<td>encouraging the repatriation flow; creating in the Russia’s society a more friendly and welcoming attitude towards all former citizens of the USSR; preferences to the potential immigrants’ ethnicity and language abilities over their skills and educational attainments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative rates of the natural growth</td>
<td>encouraging a population inflow of reproductive ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human rights and humanitarian obligations</td>
<td>granting aid to refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons; promoting Russia’s image as that of a country of equal opportunities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. The features of immigration & naturalization policy: responses of the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Approaches and solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>geoeconomic</td>
<td>encouraging immigration of students and professionals with advanced degrees (i.e. professors and researchers), business managers and executives; attracting investors and entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geocultural</td>
<td>improving ethnic, religious, and linguistic features of human inflow, creating “frame” identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural and political</td>
<td>processing the energy of the human inflow into the political nation creation, instead of the devastating confrontation of the natives and aliens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as of phase transition</td>
<td>mechanization (creating the affordable and efficient technological solutions) of socio-cultural integration of the population inflows from the developing countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both conventional answers and possible future responses unavoidably imply the necessity to encourage large-scale population inflows and arrange — in legal, institutional, organizational terms — a number of immigration and naturalization channels.
Parameters of national self-identification: who and how many?

Russian society isn’t all that unanimous in its attitude towards the only possible way to sustain the country’s population, i.e. to the mass immigration. Some Russians used to believe that migrant workers will take jobs away from natives; others are afraid of the growing crime rates caused by the aliens’ influx; yet others believe that mass immigration will lead to the loss of Russia’s national identity; also there are those who predict the inevitable collapse of the Federation — “the Death of Russia”. Meanwhile, public opinion polls and events in Russian cities and towns demonstrate the reduction of tolerance and growth of xenophobia.

Notwithstanding the position in regard to mass phobias, we should realize what and how many immigrants Russia could afford and should accept. In other words, we have to determine what population numbers are optimum for the Russian Federation in the 21 century, what quality (in terms of ethnic composition, educational attainments, skills etc.) it should be of, in which way the differing quality of the country’s population determines its numbers (and vise verse).

The issue of optimum population numbers and its growth rate does not imply a straightforward answer because of a whole range of reasons. These include: the country’s current population numbers, rates of its natural and mechanical (migration) increase, the proportion of urban and rural populations, general living standards as well as ethnic and cultural traditions, key indicators of socio-economic situation, not to mention the state ideology and geopolitical strategy of the ruling elite, etc. In the course of time and with the parameters mentioned changing, the state policy in the sphere of demography may also transform.

There is no clear position in the Russian government as well as in the society on the issue of optimum population numbers; similarly, there are no established approaches (criteria) to determine such an optimum. The authors of the report assume that the definition of such criteria first of all depends on the goals of internal and external policy the government is to attain. Nowadays, Russia has neither vigour nor will to act in a messianic manner that was so immanent of both the Russian Tsardom and Empire in the past. At the same time, the isolationism attempt isn’t realistic either — at the current level of communications, in our dynamically changing and interdependent world. Thus the most rational scenario would be a “medium” one based on the “reasonable sufficiency” principle. This principle presumes that the country’s population should be enough to ensure: (1) unity and territorial integrity of the state; (2) the socio-cultural identity of the society and strengthening its internal cohesion; (3) permanent growth of the living standards and quality of life of Russia’s citizens; and (4) high rates of the economic growth.

Russia as the destination country: outer migration potential

Despite the fact that, since the 1990s, the number of immigrants from the CIS and Baltic countries has decreased substantially, up until now it is these particular states that serve as the principal migration donors of the Russian Federation. Besides, the demographic resources they supply are the most complementary in the socio-cultural and linguistic terms. The socio-cultural (and ethnic) closeness of a considerable part of the post-Soviet states’ populations to the Russia’s natives, their fluency in Russian, and ability to get easily integrated into the Russia’s socio-cultural environment — all these allow to consider them as the most attractive category of the permanent immigrants.

The comparative analysis of the situation in the CIS and Baltic countries and its dynamics lets us estimate an aggregate demographic potential as from the point of the permanent immigration in the Russian Federation. So, it is possible to expect that in the next 10-15 years from 7.1 to 9.1 million people, of those from 4.4 to 5.2 million are ethnic Russians and the Russian-speaking, will move to the Russian Federation (optimistic assumption). Under the most favorable circumstances, the average permanent immigration from the CIS and Baltic
countries may reach **400-600 thousand** per year as an absolute maximum. It must be added that such inflow would only compensate for 60-70% of the natural loss of the Federation’s population (and even to a lesser degree it could compensate for the loss in Russia’s working age populations and, respectively, its labor force).

On the other hand, the migration potential of the CIS and Baltic countries depends not just on the absolute numbers of the ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people who still reside there or on the entire demographic potential of the former Soviet republics, but even more it depends on the efficiency of Russia’s immigration policy and on the attractiveness of the Federation as *the* place to live and work feeling safe, happy, and successful.

In any case, by 2020, the migration potential of the CIS and Baltic countries will be almost drained. Afterwards, the maximum inflow Russia might expect from the post-Soviet states is **260-400 thousand** (and two thirds of the prospective migrants will arrive from Central Asia). Such immigration won’t ever stop the Federation’s depopulation. Around 2020, Russia’s need for replacement migration would still be at least 700 thousand and up to 1.2 million per year. It is only possible to sustain those numbers if the share of immigrants from the states other than the CIS and Baltic countries would grow significantly.

Among the countries other than the CIS and Baltic states that influence immigration in the Russian Federation most are China (with its labor migration), Vietnam, Korea, and Afghanistan. Other prospective migration donors within Eurasian macro-regions are Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and India, but they stick to the immigration channels that supply labor to the more attractive European and American markets. In that sense, Russia is still off the beaten routes of the international migration and thus may only expect to deal with the “leftovers” of the worldwide population movements. The quality of life in North America, Europe, and the Gulf Emirates differs from the living standards in Russia to such an extent that migration flow is inevitably split and only its worst part (i.e. poorly educated and unskilled migrants) is heading for Russia while the best are determined to conquer the West.

Nonetheless, should Russia insist on the rather aggressive immigration policy, in the next 15-20 years it could expect an extra inflow (from the countries other than the CIS and Baltic states) of **up to 60-100 thousand** annually. In case of lifting restrictions in regard to the Chinese immigration the inflow could be even bigger. Mass immigration from China also brings certain threats: the danger of negative ethnic and political consequences provoked by the inevitable change of the population’s ethnic composition in a number of Russia’s regions grows substantially. Special labor migration agreements with selected donor countries would be of great help here: such cooperation guarantees the labor supply and, on the other hand, encourages some labor migrants to settle in Russia permanently.

Though the principal migration limitation factor is the ability of the Russian state and society to integrate prospective immigrants whose ethnicity is different from that of the Federation’s natives. With this, the adaptation and integration of the aliens originating from countries other than the CIS and Baltic states is much more complicated and extended in time than in case of the former Soviet compatriots integration. This particular circumstance prevents the government from the decision to increase the inflow from any single country (or a limited group of countries) since mass immigration of the Chinese or members of any other large ethnic group combined with their compact settlement within the Federation could easily provoke the inter-ethnic tensions and local conflicts as well as loss of control and governance at the municipal level. Obvious necessity to limit the Chinese immigration into the Russian Federation in addition to the shrinking migration potential of the CIS and Baltic countries makes the search for new migration donors the actual challenge to the state and its elites. Nonetheless, it is the only way to compensate for Russia’s population and labor force losses after 2020.
Immigration and naturalization policy: the technological solutions

The basic problem of Russia’s current immigration policy is that there are virtually no simple and transparent ways to enter the country legally. The legislation, currently in effect in Russia, isn’t aimed at attracting immigrants since it was created to meet the other needs: reducing incoming flows and fighting illegal migration. The authors of the report suggest new schemes (mechanisms) for establishing the immigration and naturalization channels. These are the part of the technological solutions, which could be useful for elaborating sound immigration policy similar to those in operation in the EU and North America.

It makes sense to single out seven priority immigration and naturalization channels: civil amnesty; repatriation of (former) compatriots; family-based admissions (family reunification); student (academic) immigration; economic (employment-based, skill-based) immigration; refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons resettlement; and army (military) immigration. All the channels mentioned should function simultaneously and be operational at three levels — federal, regional, and municipal.

The channels give priority to the admission of those immigrants who best meet the goals set out by the immigration policy. Thus, the system of preferences that entails certain limits, quotas, and sanctions must be established. The limits should filter off prospective migrants whose qualifications, educational attainments, language skills, etc. do not meet the requirements. The preferences establish a rank within a channel and might be used in case the number of applicants exceeds the quotas. The sanctions are applicable to those immigrants who have lost the grounds to apply for the legal status. Besides, the supposed trajectory of a prospective immigrant’s status growth is also designed (that means it is defined what status an immigrant is granted under certain conditions).

The concept of the immigration and naturalization channels determines the institutions and mechanisms that should attract migration flows. It also describes potential legal statuses, political and civil rights of the prospective immigrants, the naturalization procedures as well as the adaptation measures and settlement arrangements destined for various categories of immigrants.
Table 3.3. The institutions and mechanisms of recruiting and socio-cultural integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outside the country</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ministry of Foreign Affaires (embassies, consulates)</td>
<td>Vacancy fairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federal Migration Service (offices abroad)</td>
<td>Educational services fairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting agencies</td>
<td>University / college admission commissions (that work away to attract foreign students to the RF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions that work with foreign students</td>
<td>Various other elements of the foreign students recruiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian cultural centers</td>
<td>Information campaigns (for instance, “From Russia — with knowledge”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations of (former) compatriots</td>
<td>Recruiting actions and measures of the Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights organizations</td>
<td>PR-programs promoting Russia’s migration attractiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure of the ‘RosZarubezhCenter’</td>
<td>Bilateral inter-state agreements (as to the labor migration, student / academic migration, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor states’ agencies that promote education and employment of their citizens abroad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional centers for international cooperation in the sphere of education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Russia’s Council for Academic Mobility — ROCAM)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inside the country</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor migration centers</td>
<td>“Russian as the second language” test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social adaptation centers</td>
<td>Brief course on civil rights and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian language centers</td>
<td>Educational loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutor centers</td>
<td>Summer (language) schools and courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departments within the universities that work specifically with foreign students</td>
<td>Competitions, contests on Russia’s history, culture, literature, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs (various artists’ unions, women’s associations, youth organizations)</td>
<td>Information campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>PR-programs encouraging mixed families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>PR-programs promoting mutual tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>Vocational / job training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Special adaptation and socialization programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment services / labor exchanges</td>
<td>destined for the immigrants’ children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and commercial organizations able to succeed in integration and naturalization programs</td>
<td>TV series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV / mass media</td>
<td>Social advertising</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authors of the report introduce a system of *parameters* and *indicators* to monitor how the channels function. Essentially, it is a ratio of planned vs. actual results based on the following positions: correlation with the quotas defined; the number of arrivals (in various groups — according to the statuses granted); gender and age composition of the inflow; immigrants’ educational attainments, qualifications, and rates of entrepreneurship.

The indicators mentioned are as follows:

— the extent of adaptation: social cohesion, immigrants’ housing situation (home ownership), unemployment rates, family situation, immigrants’ children born in/outside the RF;

— the extent of integration: Russian language skills; accordance of the job/position occupied by immigrant to his skills/qualifications/degrees; the number of mixed marriages; birth/fertility rates (and whether these are below or above the replacement level); pre-school institutions and school attendance by the immigrants’ children; the number of educational loans received; number of (civil) suits brought by immigrants in order to protect their rights;

— the extent of naturalization: citizenship acquisition by the immigrants; citizenship acquisition by the immigrants’ children; membership in the public and political organizations; participation in the elections and referenda (if allowed by the immigrant’s status); legal statuses granted.
The framework for the regional development of the Russian Federation

Migration is usually spontaneous, but not chaotic. It has certain logic and obeys its own rules and thus is rather predictable. The human flows follow certain directions. That means if we would know where the flow is directed and why it is directed there, we could control and manage it. The control doesn’t mean strict administrative regulation, but rather ability to create certain conditions that predetermine the direction of migration flow.

If closely analyzed, the spontaneous character of migration turns out to be quite definite. Thus the directions of the population flows are rather predictable: migrants move from poor regions to the rich ones; from overpopulated countries to those experiencing certain population shrinkage; from less developed and unsafe areas to the more developed and safe ones. In general, the principal point is a different quality of life, as a rule, more safe and prosperous. Thus, it is possible to attract migrants through improving the quality of life within a certain region or area and, otherwise, it is also possible to push them away in case of deteriorating living standards. (Moreover, quite like the newcomers, the established natives behave the very same way: they are also looking for a better fortune…)

The population movements — which in essence are spatial movements — management is based on the ideas of spatial development. The “General Scheme of the Spatial Development of the Russian Federation” allows determining the principles, quantitative parameters, and directions of the human flows. At the same time, immigration should not destroy, but rather strengthen the principal trends of interior policy or, at least, not weaken them. For instance, if the country’s current system of settlements survives transformation and if the government and businesses direct this process in some way, immigration should support their endeavors.

Immigration should positively complement the internal (urban) accretion. And it is important to not undermine the process that as such is a challenging managerial task for the country’s authorities. (So, very recently, in the 1990s, the local migration services were sending immigrants to places that were abandoned by natives. This way they were unfortunately interfering with the completely natural process of the rural settlements’ network demolition.)

Besides, sound immigration policy should reflect the country’s geopolitical priorities — intentions to strengthen or, on the contrary, to weaken certain areas.

Transition to the new grounds (that are: strengthening the principal trends of the interior policy; supporting internal reforms; complementing accretion; meeting the requirements of the geopolitical and geocultural safety) of migration management entails defining the requirements to the recipient locations.

So, migration flow should be directed where:

— there are employment opportunities (with this, the long-term demand for labor should be taken into account) and prospects of self-employment (we have to encourage inflow of people able to support themselves and, moreover, create extra jobs);

— mass immigration won’t drastically change the cultural norms of the host society (foreign cultures inevitably influence the recipient society; furthermore, such influence should be welcomed as a part of an intercultural dialogue. Though, at the same time, the recipient country shouldn’t lose control over alien cultural pressures, since otherwise there is a threat to destroy ones own society’s core identity in the course of socio-cultural interaction) and mechanisms of socio-cultural “processing” (its various types: acculturation, proculturation, “soft” assimilation, integration) operate properly;

— economic growth requires permanent extra influx of work force and labor markets have a need in certain pressures;

— there is a threat to lose governance over sovereign territories and even some of those spaces.
There are not very many places in Russia that meet all those requirements. For instance, such are highly organized urban areas that form the framework for the spatial (regional) development of the country. The other example of such places is vulnerable geopolitical zones. The authors of the report present their own version of the territories typology from the point of their migration attractiveness and socio-cultural stability against migration pressures (Table 3.4).

* * *

Russia’s only chance to save its vast spaces is their effectively accelerated modern re-colonization. Russia’s only chance to defend its territories is sufficiently high rates of economic development. That’s why the country needs to make a choice: actually Russia has to accomplish transition from the policy of economic alignment to the policy of polarized growth.
Table 3.4. Types of territories, their attractiveness for newcomers and attractiveness of migration for the host territory (community)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of territory</th>
<th>Safety</th>
<th>Living standards</th>
<th>Work &amp; career</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Socio-cultural risks</th>
<th>Labor market</th>
<th>Education market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cosmopolitan “Global City”</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Maximum opportunities</td>
<td>Maximum opportunities</td>
<td>Minimum risks: in practice, able to “process” any migration inflow</td>
<td>Absolute dependence on migration</td>
<td>Prosperous just in case of high student (academic) migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technological zones</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Rather high</td>
<td>Sufficient opportunities</td>
<td>Sufficient opportunities</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovative zones</strong></td>
<td>High (in case of permanent immigration)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Specific opportunities</td>
<td>Specific opportunities</td>
<td>No risks in case of specialized recruiting</td>
<td>High and specific</td>
<td>High and specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quarrying zones</strong></td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Attractive enough</td>
<td>Two basic niches: a year-round shifts and seasonal jobs</td>
<td>(Limited) job training only, particularly aimed at upgrading of specific skills</td>
<td>Minimum risks in case of shift / seasonal mode practiced</td>
<td>High and specific</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional industrial regions</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Practically no opportunities</td>
<td>Medium/minimum opportunities, but inexpensively priced</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High in respect to entrepreneurs and self-employed</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territories of pioneer industrialization</strong></td>
<td>Only in case of patronage from local communities</td>
<td>Low and even extremely low</td>
<td>High unemployment rates</td>
<td>Religious education in the sphere of Islam only</td>
<td>Excessive numbers of local population, thus maximum risks</td>
<td>Extremely negative</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National security zones</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low, seldom medium</td>
<td>Medium, often minimum opportunities</td>
<td>Medium, often minimum</td>
<td>Varied*</td>
<td>In fact, closed for outsiders</td>
<td>High: the safest way of the aliens’ integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anthropological deserts</strong></td>
<td>Similar to pioneer conditions</td>
<td>Archaic</td>
<td>No opportunities at all</td>
<td>No opportunities at all</td>
<td>Significant ecological (environmental) risks in case of rapacious exploitation (since control is difficult and limited)</td>
<td>High demand for entrepreneurship</td>
<td>No market as such</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In some regions extremely high risks exist while in the others risks arise in case of unmanageable immigration.
Conclusion

The new geostrategic paradigm — from collecting lands to gathering people

At some moment in Russia’s history, collecting lands became the country’s principal goal and its geostrategy. Large-scale spatial expansion has always been accompanied by intensive socio-cultural integration of the alien populations. That strategy proved its worth and strength in view of the fact that it resulted in a state that ranked third in the world with its population numbers (and that just in addition to the enormous territory and colossal volumes of natural resources, which several times exceed the area and resources of any other country).

That was an overall and total strategy. Russian historian Vassily Kliuchevsky once remarked that the entire history of the Russian nation is a history of colonization. Actually, the Russians became a nation namely in the course of colonization, while demonstrating unconquerable will and ability to cultural assimilation — the quality that is only existent in combination with great openness, tolerance, and cultural curiosity. The result was a unique socio-cultural “alloy” — Fedor Dostoevsky named it *world-wide*.

In the 1960s, the colonization trend got exhausted. The Russians started to move back, to their historical homeland — Muscovia. In these very years, the net reproduction rate in Russia has dropped below 1.0\(^3\) and the male death rates began growing again after an extended decline. And in the late 1960s, when the ideological opponents of the USSR survived true cultural revolution, the country’s political leaders opted for conservation and further isolation. As a result, the country and nation failed to spot so called 2nd epidemiological transition, a fitness-revolution that heralded a new attitude towards an individual and the individuals’ new attitude towards dynamically changing reality.

Today, Russia actually has no excess demographic resources. The country is unable to generate further colonization waves based on the mass outflows of the native populations. It is unable to expand as well as continue developing in an extensive way. The country’s leadership will never again be able to “plug gaps”, which resulted from their own managerial and administrative faults, with seemingly inexhaustible and “inexpensive” human resources.

Therefore, a historical attitude to space and population in the country should be changed fundamentally. The need for a new geostrategy is obvious. That’s why the authors of the report believe: we should and could talk about transition — *from the geostrategy of collecting lands to the geostrategy of gathering people*.

Many things have to be changed in Russia. A true and large-scale socio-cultural modernization is of an urgent necessity. New attitudes and approaches to the space, population, society, and culture have to be invented. Russia is facing the turning point which is equally significant as that of the Moscow Tsardom rising.

The principal point is a new attitude of the state towards its own people. The country needs true humanization in all vital spheres — its army and penitentiary system, governance and administration, education and reproductive behavior of the population. And that is the only way to both significantly improve the quality of life of Russia’s established citizens and attract millions of new compatriots.

That’s why a new Russia’s geostrategy, whatever it would be, will inevitably have to deal with a *cultural revolution* aimed at fundamentally changing an attitude towards an individual.

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\(^3\) Number of hypothetical daughters per woman.
Full text of the report in Russian is available at: http://www.archipelag.ru/agenda/povestka/naturalization/doklad/
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