The Politics and Immigration in France, Britain and the United States: A Transatlantic Comparison

Martin A. Schain

New York University

Prepared for Conference: Immigration in a Cross-National Context: What Are the Implications for Europe?

Luxembourg, June 20-21, 2004

PRELIMINARY DRAFT PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
Introduction: The Problem

Both Europe and the United States are countries of immigration. Each year about 1.5 million immigrants legally enter the countries that comprise the European Union (the EU 15), with considerable variation among countries. A generation ago, the most important differences within Europe were between countries that had historically needed and received immigrants (France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK), and those that had been the providers of immigrants (Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). Now, however, all of the senders are receivers, and the variation is among the levels of immigration. Indeed, Europe now receives between 4.7 immigrants per thousand population on the high end (1992)—3.9 on the low end (2001), compared with about 3.8 per thousand in the United States.\(^1\)

The most important differences between Europe and the United States are not those of levels of immigration, but differences in the politics of immigration: immigration policy and the dynamics that drive this policy. The United States has a relatively open immigration policy, one that sets a (flexible) ceiling on the number of legal immigrants admitted each year, the basis on which they are to be admitted, and the principle criteria that govern admission. Although the ceilings set on immigration never exactly correspond to the actual number of immigrants admitted to the United States each year, there is general relationship between the intent of the law (to admit and limit immigrants) and the results.

In Europe, the relationship between the stated intent of the law and the results is quite different. Levels of legal immigration have remained high in Europe over a long period of time,
even after the strong declarations of “0” immigration policies at the governmental level,. Thus, although the main objectives of policy have not changed over a 25-year period, large numbers of legal immigrants– immigrant workers, as well as family-members through family reunification– have been admitted to all European countries, mostly through administrative and court decisions. Therefore, the first question raised in this paper is how we can understand the differences in policy– as well as the relationship between policy and policy outcomes– in Europe compared with the United States?

At least superficially, this difference between a relatively open policy in the United States and restrictive European policy orientation seems logical. After all, the United States is a “country of immigration,” a “nation of nations,” which has long accepted the multi-cultural diversity and challenge to national identity implied by continuing immigration. European countries, on the other hand, which have a deeper cultural sense of national identity and are far more homogeneous than the United States, have a weaker capacity to deal with high levels of immigration. However, this kind of understanding simply ignores the fact that in both Europe and the United States there have been periods of open and exclusionary policies during the past hundred years.

At least part of the explanation for the differences in policy flows from the dominant dynamics that are driving policy on either end of the Atlantic. With some variation among countries, the dominant concern that drives policy in Europe is the challenge to national identity that is posed by immigration from countries outside of Europe. These concerns about national identity are evident in public opinion surveys, and have been for many years. The immigration issue, defined in these terms, has been politicized by political parties, and has become integrated
into party competition at the national and sub-national levels. This electoral dynamic has been a key to the development of policy and its implementation throughout the European Union. Defined as a challenge to national identity during the period since the 1960s, the resultant exclusionary policy in Western Europe has resisted the challenge of labor market and welfare state needs that have developed in more recent years.

In the United States, questions of national identity that were at the core of the development of immigration policy at the turn of the last century have played a far less unimportant role in the development of more recent policy. Instead, what has increasingly dominated the politics of immigration have been considerations of electoral gain or future party gain as a result of immigrants voting. Defined in relation to a multi-cultural society after 1965, the immigration policy has remained relatively open through good and bad economic times; the core of this policy has also resisted nationalist challenges in the 1990s, and the more recent challenge of post September 11 security. Thus, I argue in this paper that, although policy on both sides of the Atlantic has been driven by electoral considerations, in Europe the focus has been on the presumed impact of immigration on voters other than immigrants; while in the United States, increasing attention has been given to immigrants themselves as voters and potential voters.

In this paper, I will analyze these questions by focusing on a comparison between the United States and two European countries—France and Britain. I will argue that two aspects of policy development are of particular importance for understanding differences in policy, as well as the complexities of developing an immigration policy for the European Union:

1. The first is the process of how questions of immigration are defined and constructed.
This implies are larger issue of issue formation or agenda-setting. Since relatively few issues make it on to the policy agenda, a process through which immigration is presented and defined is related to how it becomes a political priority. The way that these issues are defined by public authorities is a crucial aspect of policy-making that is also linked to which publics are mobilized and within which political arenas policy decisions are taken. The construction of the issue of immigration may be related to pressures of public opinion, to pressures of organized interests, to initiatives within administration, or to all three. The point is that issues do not simply emerge. They are constructed within specific institutional arenas in specific ways for specific purposes.

In his recently published study of race policies in Britain and France, Eric Bleich explains differences in Britain and France by the sharp differences of ideas in the form of “frames” that drove the dominant group of policy-makers in each case. While many differences in policy outcomes can be explained by conflict theory (groups and parties), and differences in the specific content of policy can be understood through a problem-solving approach that focus on the role of policy communities, or by the institutionalist perspectives, Bleich sees these as secondary, if what we want to understand is differences in the orientation of policy choices that are made. He argues that the same kinds of political actors in each country produced very different kinds of policies because they were operating with very different sets of ideas about the need for policy on racism, its goals and the ways it should be effective.\(^2\)

This approach forms the core of our understanding of the approach to immigration policy in France, Britain and the United States. However, we find that the ideas that structure the policy orientation are informed by strategic thinking about politics that is related to the distribution of immigrant communities within the country.
2. The second question is the way political space and arenas of decision-making influence the policy-making process and its outcomes. The arenas within which issues are developed, I would argue, provide first, a key to how the issues are defined, and second, a key to the dynamics through which they are further developed. The importance of and impact of immigration can and generally does vary considerably across geographic space. It seems reasonable to presume that public opinion, interest pressure and electoral pressure would vary with the variation in the concentration of immigrant populations, since the concentrations of immigrants across spatial areas are also related to political, social and economic costs and benefits. Thus what may appear to be national opinion, may be strong where there are high concentrations of immigrants, and indifference or better where there are not. The electoral arena is in fact a network of local constituency arenas, each electing its own representative, and each influenced by local political forces. Thus, although immigration policy and immigration regulation is usually determined in the national rather than the local political arena, it is crucial to understand the conditions under which local demands are transmitted to the national level.

The link between local dynamics and the national arena depends on the importance of specific localities for shifting national elections. Jeanette Money has argued convincingly that politicization of immigration was driven by electoral dynamics within spatially defined arenas, areas in which immigrants are concentrated. Thus, according to Money’s analysis, the size and safety of the constituencies (possible swing constituencies) is important, as is the importance of the constituency for building national coalitions. Even where size is irrelevant (as in Britain) the number of constituencies in which immigration issues are important must be related to the winning party’s electoral margin in the House of Commons. Cross-nationally, the common
thread is the need for politicians to build a national electoral majority.

Driven by electoral competition, local politicians will shift their policy positions in response to changing community preferences, toward either greater openness or greater closure.... But immigration control is determined in the national rather than the local political arena. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the conditions under which local demands are successfully transmitted to the national level.  

Similarly, each institutional arena within which decisions are made and policy developed structures decisions in a different way. It has long been recognized that the network of actors and influence within an institutional framework strongly influence policy outcomes. Indeed, the struggle over the arena itself may be an important key for understanding the ultimate outcome. Each institutional or geographic arena provides a different opportunity structure for political actors, but within that structure, a variety of outcomes are possible.

**Defining and constructing the Immigration Issue**

**France:** In many ways France is the most normal case— the most consistent with expectations. The French government moved to restrict immigration in 1974, in the midst of the oil crisis and at the beginning of what would be the end of the period of post-war expansion— the stated reason for labor immigration. The sharp move towards immigration restriction during this period was directed specifically against immigration from outside of Europe, however, and for some time immigration policy had been developed by administrative authorities with the presumption that non-European immigrants (for the most part from former French colonies) was quite different from immigration from Europe:

Must we recall that migrations of European origin were understood as migrations for work and settlement, while those from the former colonies of North Africa were considered, at least until the recognition of family reunification, as migrations of “celibate” workers?
Indeed, the part of what went into the decision to suspend immigration in 1974 was the long administrative dialogue that differentiated between European and North African immigration. This dialogue, in turn, was at the root of the tension that underpinned the policy-making process. It was certainly not anticipated that one unanticipated consequence of the suspension of immigration from the former colonies would be that:

That France [would integrate] communities organized according to their own rules, and that the rigidity of the republican model of integration [would be] distorted by forms of representation, of institutionalization, of negotiation and mediation that betrays as much the unspeakable recognition of community and cultural forms as the search for a modus vivendi or a new social contract based on the recognition of the possible limits of differences?\(^7\)

Indeed, the part of what went into the decision to suspend immigration in 1974 was the long administrative dialogue that differentiated between European and North African immigration. This dialogue, in turn, was at the root of the tension that underpinned the policy-making process.

There were solid labor market reasons for suspending immigration in 1974. However, there were also other fears that reflected patterns of public opinion. The first attempts by the French state to define a coherent policy about the new immigration began after the May crisis of 1968, and is summarized in a report written by Correntin Calvez for the Economic and Social Council in 1969. The report recognized the continuing economic need for immigrant labor, but for the first time clearly differentiated European from non-European workers. Europeans were assimilable, and should be encouraged to become French citizens, argued Calvez, while non-European immigrants constituted an "inassimilable island."

It seems desirable, therefore, more and more to give to the influx of non-European origin, and principally to the flow from the Maghreb, the character of temporary immigration for work, organized in the manner of a rapid process of introduction which would be linked as much as possible to the need for labor or the business
sectors concerned and in cooperation with the country of origin.\textsuperscript{8}

Thus, from the beginning of the process of defining and implementing immigration policy, the idea of difference was asserted, a difference that was frequently posed in (ethno-cultural) racialized terms. The new forms of racial differentiation expressed by the Calvez report had little to do with the eugenics and the biological inferiority of the new immigrants. Rather it was an expression of a perceived chasm between immigrant and French culture, what French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff has called “differential racism.”\textsuperscript{9} During the 1970s, the government struggled to develop a policy based on the main lines of the Calvez Report, but was unsuccessful.

The Left opposition was generally successful in checking and limiting what they sometimes termed the "racist" labor market policies of the governments of the Right in the 1970s at the national level. At the same time, however, representatives of the Left were defining issues and developing integration policies at the local level that were based on similar racial assumptions. In contrast to "the tradition of solidarity" that Communist-governed municipalities had developed towards predominantly European immigrants, by the 1970s many of these same local governments began to treat non-European immigrants, as well as non-white French citizens from the overseas departments, as temporary residents who must be encouraged to return home.\textsuperscript{10}

By the 1980s the racialization of immigration had taken on positive as well as negative aspects at the national level. The government of the Left was persuaded that non-European immigrants would not soon depart, and therefore the state needed to deal more decisively with problems of integration. At the same time, however, the government retained an approach that
set these immigrants apart as a special case. As Gary Freeman has noted:

In a sense, once the state had committed itself to this racially discriminatory policy, it had more incentive than before to increase the effectiveness and generosity of its social policies towards migrants. The fact that a large part of its immigrant population would be permanent persuaded officials that more needed to be done on their behalf.\(^{11}\)

After the suspension of immigration in 1974, an increasingly dense network of state institutions and programs were developed to deal with problems of incorporation and integration. The first initiatives in the 1970s were taken in the areas of education and housing. While the objectives of these programs were often contradictory, they were all efforts that tended to treat immigrant groups as collectivities rather than individuals.

Two trends assured that the immigrant issue, defined in terms of national identity and/or ethnic danger to the French nation, would remain on the national political agenda. The first was the rapid decline of the Communist Party that first became evident in 1981, but in many respects had begun in the 1970s. Although the Communists had tried to exploit anti-immigrant sentiments during the presidential election campaign of 1980-81, the party organization had also defended immigrant rights at the local level, and effectively mobilized voters at election-time. As the party organization declined during the 1980s, it was not replaced by an effective Socialist machine. This meant that even when the Communists moved away from its position of 1980-81, the Left in general would be less effective in mobilizing against a resurgent Right that based its appeal on an anti-immigrant stance. The second was the rise of the anti-immigrant National Front in the mid-1980s, often in the very areas in which the Communists were declining. This assured that the racialized approach to immigration would become a more permanent part of the discourse of French electoral politics.
Thus, the definition of the immigration issue and the shift in public policy during the 1970s rested on assumptions about non-European immigration that anticipated reactions in public opinion, and certainly corresponded to public sentiments about both immigration and the differences between immigrant groups.

**Britain:** In many ways the British case is most interesting in this context. After 1905, British law differentiated between aliens and Commonwealth citizens. Although alien entry was restricted, the entry of Commonwealth citizens was not. Like the United States, but unlike France, Commonwealth immigration consisted largely of families, and therefore had an impact by the 1960s well beyond the labor market.

The first moves towards immigration restriction were taken during a period of full employment, well before the economic crisis of the 1970s, and well before those of other countries in Western Europe. Thus, labor market considerations were not a serious consideration in this decision. Beginning in 1961, first the Conservatives, then in 1964 Labour, openly favored immigration restriction of non-white Commonwealth immigrants. Although Labour opposed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, it actually extended restriction when it came to power in 1964, and then passed even more restrictive legislation in 1968. Subsequent legislation between 1971 and 1992 served to break down the distinction between aliens and Commonwealth citizens, and the acceptance of the patrial standard sharply restricted entry of non-white (New Commonwealth) citizens into the UK.¹²

There is a vast literature on immigration control by both UK and US scholars that relates public opinion to the restrictionist policies first initiated by governments in the 1960s. Most of this literature agrees that restrictionist policies were first introduced in response to rising public
opinion against non-white Commonwealth immigration. Indeed, the key element that is cited is
the reaction to the riots in the Notting Hill area of London and Nottingham in 1958. Yet, as
Money points out, there had been race riots in Liverpool in 1948, as well as Birmingham and
Deptford (London) in 1954, without a public policy reaction.¹³

There is now a significant body of literature on immigration controls in Britain that goes
one step further, and argues either explicitly or implicitly that public opinion on this issue was
manipulated by increasingly racist political elites into opposing immigration, and this opposition
was then used to justify imposition of increasingly restrictive immigration controls.¹⁴ In his
recent study of British immigration policy, Randall Hansen argues persuasively that public
opinion appears to have needed little manipulation in its opposition to immigration and its
support for restrictive legislation. Indeed, as in France and the United States, political elites who
favored immigration could draw little comfort from low levels of mass support, and there is no
indication that variations in policy were driven one way or the other by public opinion.¹⁵

Indeed, at least in the early 1960s, there was considerable support among business and
political elites for increasing, not decreasing, labor market immigration.

As late as 1965, the government predicted labor shortages of two hundred thousand annually. Declining industries, especially the northern textile companies, relied on immigrant labor maintain their competitive advantage. And the British government itself was actively involved in recruiting immigrant labor for the London Transport and the National Health Service. The British Hotels and Restaurants Association also actively enlisted Commonwealth immigrants.... The newly arrived immigrants found housing in inner city areas that were vacated when the native workforce moved to more desirable suburban locations.¹⁶

On the other hand, this does not mean that public opinion was not important in the
development of immigration policy in Britain, or that a racist construction of the immigration
issue by political elites did not happen or was not important. As in France, what most concerned
policy-makers well before the initiation of restrictions were racial tensions and the perceived problems of integrating non-white immigrant groups. Although there was clear conflict within each political party, even before 1962, about the need for immigration restriction from New Commonwealth countries, the core of the dialogue in each case turned on racial differences and race-relations. The Tories, who had previous argued that the experience in the Commonwealth demonstrated the viability of race relations, argued in 1965 that they “...reject the multi-racial state not because we are superior to our Commonwealth partners but because we want to maintain the kind of Britain we know and love.” Labour first challenged the 1962 legislation because, as Gaitskell said, it carried racial overtones, then linked their support of even tighter immigration restriction with the Race Relations Act of 1965. The racialization of the immigration issue certainly reflected public opinion, but more importantly, it defined the way that the issue would be politicized.

In fact the dialogue around third world immigration in Britain among political elites was not different from the dialogue in France. As in France, what most concerned policy-makers well before the initiation of restrictions were racial tensions and the perceived problems of integrating non-white immigrant groups. Although there was clear conflict within each political party, even before 1962, about the need for immigration restriction from New Commonwealth countries, the core of the dialogue in each case turned on racial differences and race-relations. The racialization of the immigration issue certainly reflected public opinion, but more importantly, it defined the way that the issue would be politicized. Although the dialogue around third world immigration in Britain among political elites was similar to the dialogue in France, there were some important differences. In Britain, in contrast with France, the issue
involved the re-definition of citizenship and the reduction of rights of Commonwealth citizenship. In addition, this debate took place within and between political parties in Britain, while in France the initial discussion took place within the administration. On the other hand, the racialization of the immigration issue in both countries was based far more on anticipated problems of integration, rather than on existing problems, and sharpened the perceived differences between immigrants and natives—and even other immigrants.

**The United States:** The definition of the political issue of immigration in the United States has been deeply linked to a complex history of racism, and appears to have little to do with labor market needs. Until the mid-1890s, the focus of discussion among political elites had been almost entirely on limiting the entry of categories of undesirable immigrants. The major exception, however, was Chinese exclusion. A decade long racist campaign in California—led by the early labor movement in the 1870s—resulted first in the success of the Democratic Party in the state, and then in the successful passage of the Chinese exclusion act in 1882. The campaign also served as the impetus for the establishment of the AFL as a national trade union organization. The racial arguments that were developed for this campaign in California and then used in Washington, most unambiguously by the Democrats, were then broadly extended and given a scientific base by Republican restrictionists in the 1890s.

Discussions of immigration were focused on the problem of assimilation of Europeans, and on an effort to define the content of American citizenship, and both were tied to more highly focused scientific discussions of race based on eugenics, and on a new nationalism based on racial and religious type. The impetus for the redefinition of the immigration issue in nationalist and racial terms, came from congressional leaders and intellectuals. After Chinese exclusion in
1882, the first indication of a more general change in approach towards immigration during the
1890s, came with the emergence of a movement to impose literacy tests on new immigrants.
The movement was organized and led by the Immigration Restriction League, founded by
Boston intellectuals in 1892, and for which Senators William E. Chandler and Henry Cabot
Lodge were the chief spokesmen. Chandler was the chairman of the Senate Immigration
Committee, which had been established in 1889. Literacy tests, argued Chandler, were the most
effective means of restricting the entry of certain races, alien to American nationality. "No one,
he said in 1892, "has suggested a race distinction. We are confronted by the fact, however, that
the poorest immigrants do come from certain races."^20

The 1890s marked the beginning of a debate on the relationship between "Americanism"
and immigration that would last until the imposition of strict immigration restriction in 1924. In
many ways, this debate would continue through the Cold War, and would endure into the
present. The political debate focused on national integration, race, and the danger of "alien
races" (Henry Cabot Lodge's phrase) for American democratic institutions.

The definition of the core problem of European immigration as "racial" in content is
evident in the Senate report that accompanied the Immigration Act of 1891, and was a particular
concern of patrician advocates of restriction in the Immigration Restriction League linked to
Congress.

The illiteracy test will affect almost entirely those races whose immigration to the
United States has begun within recent times and which are most alien in language
and origin to the people who founded the 13 colonies and have built up the United States....

Racial concerns made it possible for Republican restrictionists– based almost entirely in the
Boston area– to distance themselves from the business orientation of their party at the turn of the
century, and finally to link their political agenda to that of Southern Democrats, who, with some reluctance, accepted the racialization of the new immigration. This definition of the problem of immigration from Europe did not become widespread beyond Congress until the turn of the century, when patrician concerns about race, supported by new areas of scientific enquiry, gave form to growing popular nativism.

Henry Cabot Lodge, the most important congressional leader of the political movement against the new immigration before the First World War, made considerable effort to build his case with scientific support for racial differences. Lodge's thinking (and writing), in fact, was part of an on-going dialogue that included at least one university president (Francis Walker of M.I.T.), one of the leading sociologist of the day (Franklin Giddings, the first professor of sociology at Columbia University), and, ultimately, the president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt. In a wide-ranging debate on the ability of the United States to absorb the new tide of immigrants, the focus was increasingly on race and racial superiority or inferiority. On both sides of the issue the definition of the immigrant problem was becoming racial.

Walker argued that the superior Anglo-Saxon racial strains were being overwhelmed by inferior European strains, in part because of declining native birthrates, while Giddings contended that we had nothing to worry about, since the superior Anglo-Saxon races would dominate here as they dominated there. Roosevelt, while rejecting the case for restriction, concluded that we may have something to worry about, and initiated a campaign for more children (and against birth control) to prevent "race suicide."

The President's campaign, in itself, greatly accelerated and popularized race thinking. After analyzing the reaction to the campaign in the popular press, the historian John Higham
concludes that

In the end, the whole discussion probably caused more race-thinking than reproduction. At least it brought to a wider audience the racial pessimism previously confined to a limited group of upper-class intellectuals.  

By the time of the First World War, race thinking had become well-established among virtually all political actors, and became integrated into political thinking through the actions and writing of government agencies.

By the 1960s, forty years later, this definition of the problem of immigration had disappeared. We were a “nation of nations,” argued President Kennedy, in a famous speech in 1962. In practice, the national quota basis of the legislation had been somewhat undermined between 1945 and 1965 by the exigencies of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the legislation could not be changed without challenging the assumptions behind it. With its emphasis on the relationship of immigrant applicants to American citizens or lawful aliens (family-based criteria), it reproduced some of the concerns behind the 1924 legislation, but without the most invidious racial criteria.

This was facilitated by the emergence of the Civil Rights revolution in the 1960s. The change emerged through a process that began with ethnic organization, by the recognition of the legitimacy of a multi-ethnic America that was portrayed by government propaganda during the Second World War, and that was reinforced by the emergence of what Martin Kilson has called "Black neo-ethnicity" in the 1960s. Indeed, the ideal of neo-ethnicity, a Nation of Nations, began to emerge at the same time that intermarriage among the children and grand-children of European immigrants was sharply on the rise, and when important indicators of ethnic "memberships" were on the decline (organizational membership and language ability above all).
Government programs in the 1960s that effectively "created" minorities "... by ascribing to them certain characteristics that serve to justify their assignment to particular societal roles," represented an attempt to deal with a racial crisis, not immigration or assertions of multiculturalism, but had unanticipated responses.\textsuperscript{25} Within a decade, the impact of "re-ethnicization" had effectively challenged the melting pot understanding among policy-making elites. By 1965, the racial criteria of the early part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century no longer had support among any sector of the political elite, although the quota system continued to be defended within the judiciary committees in terms of cultural assimilation.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, at a time when political leaders in France and Britain were developing race-based criteria as a basis for restrictive legislation, their counterparts in the United States were abandoning these criteria as a basis of exclusion. Moreover, at a time when their European counterparts were attempting to sharply reduce immigration, they were seeking a more “rational” basis for continuing legal entry into the United States. Efforts to reform the system were first pursued during the Truman administration, continued under Eisenhower and Kennedy, and finally implemented under Johnson, framed by both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Right Act of 1965.

In practical terms, the system had been undermined after 1945 by special legislation that progressively went around its assumptions. By the post-war period, only one in three immigrants entered the United States under the national origins system.\textsuperscript{27} Nevertheless, what held the reformers together was fundamental opposition to the racial and discriminatory basis of the quota system, and support for a new system that more consistent with the values of the 1960s. What is most striking, however, is that given the long history of racism in the United States, the issue of
immigration did not become racialized after 1965, even when it became apparent that the primary result of the new legislation was a rising wave of Third World immigration.

Nevertheless, for a moment in time in the mid-1990's it appeared as if the pattern would be repeated, that in a somewhat different form the politics of immigration in the United States would reproduce the radicalized pattern of Europe, and, indeed, our own heritage from the early part of the century. Many of the elements seemed to be in place: a political reaction in which California was the cutting edge, an upsurge of public opinion that followed the political initiative, and the beginning of a resurgence of a movement that resembled the eugenics movement of the turn of the century. Dorothy Nelkin wrote at the time that:

The immigration discourse of the mid-1990s is assuming an ominous but familiar tone. We hear, for example, that “natural” laws support “territorial integrity,” that certain groups are “genetically inferior,” that immutable biological differences underlie social distinctions, and that immigration will weaken the American “gene pool” and result in “race suicide.” Once again, arguments about race relations in America (The Bell Curve) have been linked to immigration (Brimelow, Rushton, and the statements issued by FAIR).²⁸

Indeed, only a few years ago, in 1997, the now forgotten US Commission on Immigration Reform (the Jordan Commission) recommended that legal immigration be cut by a third; in 1994, the State of California passed a referendum, Proposition 187, that would limit access of even the children of illegal immigrants to schools, hospitals and welfare services; and federal legislation in 1996 limited some welfare state benefits to legal immigrants. Finally, public opinion seemed to be moving sharply towards support for at least limited restriction.
It appeared that California was once again serving as a harbinger of changes in national policy. However, in many ways, the lessons of California were far different from the anti-immigrant storm that emerged out of California a century before (see above). As it evolved, the campaign in California focused most intensely on the economic burden of the new immigration, and when the economy improved during the next five years, the racial campaign gained little support. Moreover, although the campaign in California began as a challenge to immigration, it unexpectedly encouraged the political mobilization of the Mexican-Americans, who then began to vote in larger numbers. As more immigrants and ethnic Mexicans began to vote, the focus of the immigration issue for political leaders began to change (see below), not only in California, but throughout the country.

**Political space and arenas of decision-making**

In each of our cases, the definition of the problem of immigration has been directly related both to questions of political space, as well as to the arenas of decision-making within which immigration policy is developed— but not however in predictable ways. Thus, the politicization of immigration issues is related to the distribution and concentration of immigrant populations. However, how can we then understand the content of immigration policy, the outcome of politicization?

**France:** Jeanette Money, presents new evidence that as early as 1971 the Right-wing national majority began to take immigration control and the “problem” of immigrants seriously for electoral purposes at the local level, as part of a strategy to defend their majority against the resurgent Left. She demonstrates that there were a high proportion of potential swing electoral
constituencies in departments with high concentrations of immigrants (generally, where the Left
was strong), and that the Right-wing majority targeted anti-immigrant appeals to those
constituencies. These appeals were widespread during the municipal elections of 1971, the
legislative election campaign in 1973, and were even more widespread during the presidential
election campaign in 1974. Thus, although immigration was certainly not an important national
issue in these campaigns, it was of far greater importance at the local level, in swing
constituencies controlled by the Left, and seen as vulnerable by the Right.

Although there is no question that immigration issues were important to Communist and
some Socialist mayors in towns with large immigrant populations during this period.
Communist mayors in particular anticipated political reactions to immigration, and Right-wing
rivals saw this as an issue that could be exploited. Nevertheless, there was no clear evidence of
pressure from the voters themselves, and attempts to mobilize voters around immigration were
not successful. By the late 1970s, Communist local governments were trying to limit access of
immigrant residents to local services, and were pressing the national government to impose local
quotas on the immigrants resident in these towns. This was capped by an anti-immigrant
campaign by the Communist Party during the presidential election of 1981. However, this
campaign faded quickly, when the campaign failed to resonate among voters, and after the PCF
lost support in the towns that had been the focus of this campaign.29

In fact, in the 1973 legislative elections the Right lost support in constituencies where the
Left was strong, many of which were those swing constituencies with high immigrant
populations that had been targeted by the Right. In this context, although there was certainly
political pressure from some local governments in areas of high immigrant concentrations, this is
quite different from electoral or public pressure. Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between voter concerns, and the priorities of voter concerns when they actually vote. Indeed, as late as 1984 (at the point of the breakthrough of the National Front), only 6 percent of the French electorate gave immigration as a motivation for the electoral choice.

Even after the question of immigration was clearly on the political agenda, opposition to immigration tended to vary considerably by locality, but not in the expected way. If we examine the variation of anti-immigrant public opinion in 1996 by geographic concentrations of immigrants among different towns (communes), for example, we find that opposition declines as the proportion of immigrants increases. (See Table 1) This would appear to support some of the ideas of contact theory developed in the American context: either that more extensive contact tends to reduce opposition and conflict; or that in areas where there are high concentrations of immigrants, the French population most strongly opposed to immigration tend to move somewhere else. On closer examination, however, it appears that this inverse relationship most accurately reflected the sentiments of respondents who identify with the Left, rather than the Right. In fact, we can infer from Table 1 a growing gap between voters of the Left and Right as the proportion of immigrants increases within communes. Where the immigrant population is more than 10 percent, the gap between Left and Right is, on average, more than 50 percent; compared to 14 percent where there is no immigrant population.

Indeed, it was the National Front that succeeded where other parties had failed to politicize the issue of immigration, and to mobilize large numbers of voters for whom immigration was a political priority. In 1986, well before the more general mobilization of working class voters in favor the FN in 1993, there was an impressive electoral breakthrough for
the National Front in the core Communist bastions, all towns in departments with indicators of “high anti-immigrant pressure” analyzed by Money, that had maintained Communist local governments since at least 1947. The combination of anti-immigrant sentiments and concentrations of immigrants tended to magnify support for FN and diminish support for the traditional right.

However, the success of the National Front did not simply mobilize public opinion, it changed it by politicizing it. In 1984, what most clearly differentiated the voters for the National Front from those of the more established right (as well as other parties) was the priority that they gave to the issue of immigration. (see Table 2). What is more striking, however, is how the issue priorities of the National Front and its voters appear to have influenced the priorities of those voting for other political parties. Relatively few voters aside from those that supported the National Front considered either immigration or law and order to be a strong priority at the time that FN achieved its electoral breakthrough. By 1988, however, the importance of these issues ranked with such issues as social inequality, and far higher than concerns about the environment, corruption and the construction of Europe; only concern with unemployment ranked higher.

In this context of politicized public opinion the relationship between attitudes and concentrations of immigrants at the commune level becomes more important. In those areas where the established parties of the right were not successful in stimulating transfers of votes from the left by raising anti-immigration issues, the FN was far more successful in luring transfers from the established right and attracting new voters from the potential working class constituency of the left. All of this followed, but solidified, the basic decision of 1974 to impose immigration controls.
Since the 1970s, the political geography of immigration in France has changed substantially. Areas of immigrant population have become more concentrated, while the political domination of these areas by the left has been reversed. Thus, by 1999, only 17 percent of the electoral circumscriptions in France had immigrant populations of more than 10 percent. More than 70 percent of these circumscriptions were in the Paris region, with most of these in the suburbs. However, a majority of them were represented by the Right—everywhere except in the city of Paris itself. This shift is indirectly related to the success of the National Front, because of its growing ability to mobilize working class voters; even where the National Front was eliminated or withdrew in the second round, most of these voters never shifted back to the Left. Although the normal vote of the Left has declined by only a few percentage points since the 1970s, it has declined far more in the 32 départements in which there is the highest concentration of immigrants than in other départements. The turning point—argues Pierre Martin—is the European elections of 1984, the first percée of the National Front. In this way, immigrant presence provides a key to the realignment of the party system.

Table 1 indicates that higher concentrations of immigrant populations offers the possibility of politicization, but in which way? How should the policy problem be defined, and how should policy be developed? In France, the definition of the problem has long been that of ethnic danger. Locally, however, there have been variations in the way the problem has been defined. Some towns governed by the left (generally the Socialists) have seen immigrants as a political resource, and Table 1 reflects this orientation. On the other hand, towns governed by the right have been generally prone to see immigrants as a challenge to French identity. Table 1 reflects this as well. However, with so few circumscriptions with concentrations of immigrants
more than 10 percent, and with most of these circumscriptions dominated by the right, there
appears to be little incentive to define the problem of immigration in more positive terms.

On one hand, this has meant that the political advantage of a more positive approach to
immigration nationally is limited, since there are few electoral constituencies in which there are
large numbers of immigrants who could represent a potential gain in electoral support. On the
other hand, the political will to do so is substantially reduced as these areas have become
dominated by the Right, which tends to see immigrants as a problem rather than as an electoral
potential. (See Table 3) In France, the pressure that drove the immigration issue towards
restriction in the 1970s came from localities dominated by the Left, pressures that were
moderated by their national parties. From the early 1980s, the issue was driven by constituency-
level competition between the established Right and the National Front.

**Britain:** In contrast to France, where immigrant concentration was strongest in localities
dominated by the Left, at least during the period when immigration restriction was initiated, two-
thirds of the 106 constituencies with at least 5 percent foreign-born population were held by the
Conservatives after the 1959 parliamentary elections. About a third of these were classified by
the Tories as swing constituencies.

Jeannette Money argues that this provided an incentive for the Conservatives to initiate
legislation for immigration restriction as a response to voter sentiment in key constituencies.
Nevertheless, as in France, the political gain nationally was minimal, and the Tories lost the 1964
election. There was also clear electoral pressure in some Labour-represented constituencies with
high immigrant populations, where Butler and Stokes estimate that Labour lost three seats and
was prevented from winning others. In Aston (Birmingham), the sitting Labour candidate lost
his seat in 1964 after he refused to shift his stand on immigration— even though the party itself supported the Tory legislation of 1962 that it had vehemently opposed at the time. And then, of course, there was the shock of Smethwick, a safe midlands constituency where Patrick Gordon Walker—Labour’s shadow foreign secretary— was overwhelmed by his anti-immigrant Conservative opponent; he then lost again in a by-election a few months later, when the party gave him a safe seat to bring him back into the cabinet. Anthony Messina argues that “The extent to which the electoral outcome at Smethwick altered the major parties’, and especially Labour’s, perception of the race issue cannot be overstated.” Ten years later, Labour leader Richard Crossman would summarized the problem:

> Ever since the Smethwick election it has been quite clear that immigration can be the greatest potential vote-loser for the Labour party if we are seen to be permitting a flood of immigrants to come and blight the central areas in all our cities. 

Nevertheless, there is at least some evidence that the electoral pressure played differently for the Tories than for Labour; that far from attempting to outbid one another to “...shift their policy positions in response to changing community preferences,” each party was seeking to mobilize different kinds of voters in areas of high immigrant concentration. In a survey taken among MPs in 1969, the differences between the two major parties could not have been more stark, with Labour MPs strongly opposed to restriction, and more opposed in constituencies of high immigrant concentration. The commitment of Tory MPs, on the other hand, was to go much further down the road of restriction, even after the most restrictive legislation had already been passed— and even during a period when policy agreement between Labour and the Conservatives appeared to be strong. By 1969, well over half of Tory MPs were prepared to agree with the most radical anti-immigrant propositions, with the percentage increasing with immigrant concentration.
Therefore, immigration appeared to be a Conservative issue that divided Conservative politicians, far more than an issue that divided the left. There is plenty of evidence of electoral pressure at the constituency level, but the impact of that pressure was different for each of the major parties. For the Tories, the pressure from MPs was for a commitment to greater restriction; for Labour MPs representing constituencies with large numbers of immigrants tended to favor less restriction. What seems to have happened in Britain is that national parties assumed relatively moderate national positions on immigration restriction, in reaction to more radical pressured from their constituency organizations. The political dynamics were also different. In France the positions of the national and local parties of the Right were similar; while the local parties of the Left appeared to be more consistently favorable to restriction than the national parties, which were far more conflicted.

However, although in France, the political geography of immigration has changed substantially since the 1960s, the change in Britain seems somewhat more limited. As in France, the areas with immigrant concentration have remained small and concentrated in a few areas. However, in contrast to the 1960s, we can estimate that there has been a substantial growth in the number of electoral constituencies with more than 10 percent New Commonwealth immigrants. We can tentatively estimate this change from the most recent census data. Table 5 summarizes the results of localities in which the non-white population is greater than 10%, together with estimates of the party affiliation of the MP elected in 1997. Of the 387 local authorities for which we have census results, 59 (15.2 percent) have non-white populations of 10 percent of more, of which 25 are in London, 4 in the Manchester area, and 11 in the remainder of the midlands.
However, it is less clear that there has been a shift in political representation in these areas. In the 1960s Money reports that 17% of the electoral constituencies had immigrant populations of 5% or more, and of these, two-thirds were represented by Tories. On the other hand, Frasure’s estimate of representation during this period, based on different estimates, gives the clear advantage to Labour.  

Of the 44 local authorities for which we can reasonable estimate political representation, 35 are represented by Labour. They are in the very same areas cited by Frasure. This would appear to increase the incentives for more a more positive orientation towards immigrants (or non-whites), as well as incentives for their electoral mobilization at the local level. The opportunities, however, remain relatively limited.

**The United States:** The US case is quite different from the European cases, both with regard to the political geography of immigration, and with regard to the relationship between political geography and policy outcomes. As in France and Britain, immigrant populations have been highly concentrated in the United States. In 1990 only six states (California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey and Illinois, in that order) accounted for almost three-quarters of the foreign-born population in the United States, with California and New York alone accounting for almost half. Politically, immigrant populations in these states gained considerable importance— or at least potential importance— during the following decade. In each of them, congressional districts (CDs) with 10 percent or more of the populations born abroad accounted for half or more of the CDs by 2000. Thus, with two exceptions, every CD in California had a population born abroad greater than 10 percent, as did two-thirds of those in NY, and more than half in Texas. In each state, the local political dilemma was how do deal with the question of immigration and immigrants.
One option was presented in California where a sustained effort was made to mobilize growing negative public opinion against undocumented immigrants. In an environment of high immigration pressure and rising local unemployment, Proposition 187— that would limit access of these immigrants and their families to state services— qualified for the 1994 ballot, supported by Republican Governor Pete Wilson who had previously supported immigration from Mexico. Wilson was re-elected and the initiative passed in a campaign that grew increasingly anti-immigrant in general as it wore on. During the same time-period, both Democratic senators from California introduced immigration control legislation in the U.S. Senate. During the next two years, President Clinton toughened the patrols along the Mexican border, supported legislation that restricted the rights of legal aliens, and established the Commission on Immigration Reform, the Jordan Commission, which quickly recommended a reduction in annual immigration limits. Finally, Pat Buchanan became the most prominent political leader in favor of immigration restriction after his Republican primary victory in New Hampshire in 1996. Thus the California conflagration spread quickly to national politics.

The Electoral Option

A second option, however, was presented in other states with high immigrant concentration. Although there was some anti-immigrant activity in Florida and Texas during this period, it was not supported by state governments; and there was virtually no such activity in other areas of immigration concentration, specifically New York. In addition, although there were certainly attempts to define the immigration problem in racial terms by certain pundits, intellectuals and politicians (notably Pat Buchanan), even as constructed in California and
Washington, it was essentially a welfare issue, i.e. competition for limited resources.

Surprisingly, given the history of immigration and race in the United States, attempts to racialize the immigration issue did not resonate with public opinion. In Michèle Lamont’s study of American and French workers (researched during this period in the New York and Paris metropolitan areas), in contrast to their French counterparts, American workers (white and black):

...do not define “people like us” in clear opposition to immigrants. In interviews, most were indifferent to them. Others held relatively positive views of this group. A few had more negative views and focused almost exclusively on language issues as opposed to moral character issues. This pattern holds for white and black workers.  

The construction of the immigration issue in welfare terms, moreover, meant that electoral pressures were defined in a different way than in France or Britain. As the economic constraints began to ease in California (and nationally) after the mid-1990s, attitudes towards immigrants and immigration began to change as well. (See Table 6)

However, the change of attitudes seemed to be substantially linked to the resurgence of a second political option for dealing with immigration, an electoral option that gave priority to the mobilization of potential immigrant voters. The politics of immigration in both France and Britain was built around the mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the other impact of immigration is the potential of citizenship, its impact on the distribution of votes among political parties, and the speed with which this impact is felt. After all, Kristi Andersen demonstrates that the party realignment that took place in the United States between 1928 and 1936 was essentially related to a new electorate of immigrants and their children voting for the first time in large cities in the United States, rather than voters switching from the Republican to
the Democratic Party. More recently, in areas of high immigration, where immigrants are voters or are perceived as voters or potential voters, the electoral pressure has increasingly moved political elites towards a more favorable position on immigration. This dynamic appears to have taken hold in the United States, first in localities like New York and California, and more recently at the national level.

Almost a decade after Proposition 187, it is clear that the impact in California was to mobilize new immigrant voters around the Democratic Party. Wilson lost his second race for governor, and Orange County, long a conservative Republican bastion, is now increasingly competitive, thanks to the incorporation of Latin American immigrants and their children into the electorate. On the national level, immigration is at an historic high, interest in restriction in Congress seems to have faded, and public opinion, in contrast to most countries in Europe, has moved against restrictionism. Pat Buchanan played no significant role in the presidential election of 2000 (if we ignore the “chad” fiasco in Florida), leading Republicans have spoken favorably in favor of more open borders, and the conservative president of the United States is generally favorable to immigration and immigrants—often in Spanish! Finally, most recently, the AFL-CIO announced that it would no longer oppose even illegal immigration, and would make a major effort to organize new immigrant workers.

Certainly the most interesting aspect of this change has been the decision by the president to court the Latino and prospective Latino vote. Existing studies show that Latinos (with the exception of Cubans) are strongly Democratic in orientation, and become more so with increasing education and tenure in the United States. As governor of Texas, President Bush had some success in attracting Latino voters, and the president seems to feel that not to make this effort
would be to surrender the electoral future to the Democrats.  

At least some of this shift in orientation can be attributed to the very different kind of political geography of immigration in the United States as compared to Europe. Concentrations of immigrant populations are limited certain areas of the country, but from a national perspective, these areas are crucial in presidential elections. Moreover, though limited, these areas are also far more widespread than in Europe. (See Table 7) More than a third (35%) of the congressional districts in 2000 had immigrant populations of 10 percent or more, and, although they tend to be concentrated in relatively few states, they are spread among 22 states. This distribution of CDs with a high proportion of immigrants is far greater than in France or Britain (about twice as great), and provides a reasonable measure of the potential electoral gains.

While these gains can be particularly important for the Democrats, since two-thirds of these CDs have Democratic representation, the challenge is also quite real for the Republicans who represent the other third. With this number of CDs at stake, neither party can afford to ignore the electoral potential of immigrant populations. In this sense, compared to France and Britain, the electoral stakes are far more important in the United States. While the mobilization of immigrant citizens and ethnic voters has become central to American party competition at the national level, it has been marginal and episodic in France and Britain.  

The evolution of this dynamic, which appears to have taken hold first in localities like New York, may be to be related to the local access structure. In part, because the structure of politics is quite different Los Angeles and New York, a larger immigrant population was isolated from the political system in LA for a longer period of time. The combination of non-partisan elections, a highly centralized system and a small city council with large districts gave Mexican-
Americans little leverage in local government.

Whereas New York’s ethnic demography leads to electoral competition, LA’s demography has the opposite result. Heavy immigrant densities make the Mexican-American districts into rotten boroughs, where only a small proportion of the adult population votes. Thus, in the recent mayoral election, the most densely Mexican council district turned out one fifth as many voters as did the heavily white districts in the San Fernando Valley or the west side. In New York’s last mayoral election, by contrast, the turnout in immigrant Crown Heights was more than two-thirds the turnout on the affluent, largely white upper east side.  

In effect, the proliferation of electoral offices in New York during the 1990s, and the greater openness of the system, provided a structure that incorporated immigrants more rapidly into the political system. Of course this also made it less tempting to use immigrant population as object of an anti-immigrant campaign. Despite these constraints, however, the impact of new voters—even in California—is now being felt.

**Conclusions**

This paper began with an attempt to understand differences between policy on immigration in Europe and the United States. To understand these differences, we focused first on how the question of immigration has been defined and politicized on either side of the Atlantic. These differences, of course are striking, and— I have argued— are related to differences in political geography. The electoral dynamic that has been increasingly important in the US case has made it more difficult to define the immigration question in exclusionary terms. This dynamic, in turn, has also had an impact on public opinion, and support for a more open immigration policy.

In France and Britain, the exclusionary definition of the immigration question has been challenged less than in the United States by the political geography of immigration. Although in each case political geography has provided a different political opportunity structure for the
development of policy, even under similar circumstances, the outcomes tended to vary in specific ways. In Britain, the radical orientation of Tory MPs in constituencies with relatively high percentages of immigrants reverberated throughout the party, and tended to encourage the move towards exclusion by consensus at the national level in the 1960s, since each national party developed a compromise towards the center. Since then, there has been little incentive to move in a different direction. In the French case, control by the Left of areas of immigrant concentration resulted in a substantial problem at the local level, and pressures for exclusionary policies, at the same time that national parties pressured for policies that work to the benefit of immigrants already in the country. In more recent years, the combination of conservative political representation of immigrant areas, and the pressure imposed by the National Front, has meant that there has been very little incentive to develop a more open policy orientation on immigration.

Thus, the development of immigration policy on either side of the Atlantic is related to political forces that are quite different, particularly if we focus on issue definition and the political geography of immigration. The politics of immigration in the United States tend to favor more open immigration policies, in contrast to Europe, where the politics of immigration tend to create pressures that favor the maintenance of immigration restriction.

On the other hand, there are now other pressures in Europe which tend to favor more open immigration policies. The Tampere summit of European heads of state, in 1999, recognized two widely discussed needs in Europe for immigrant labor: labor market needs in such areas as technology, agriculture, construction and services; demographic needs posed by pressures on the welfare state. 41
It has been difficult to raise this issue at the national level because of the challenge of the extreme right in a number of European countries. Nevertheless, there have been some tentative movements to redefine the immigration problem. In France, just after the split in the extreme-right National Front in 1999, former prime minister Alain Juppé proposed a more open immigration policy, that would take into consideration emerging labor and demographic needs. His proposals might have been taken more seriously, had the National Front not begun to show increased strength in the months after they were made. Nevertheless, the issue has not disappeared, and has continued to be publicly discussed in government reports. In Germany, the SPD/Green Government persevered for three years, and finally passed legislation (in a compromise with the CDU opposition) in June 2004 that would formally open the country to legal immigration of skilled workers from outside of the European Union, for the first time since the 1970s.

Harmonization of these initiatives at the European level—the mandate of Tampere—is limited by the fact that few EU countries have anything resembling an immigration policy of any kind (beyond a policy of restriction). Nevertheless, through its reports and recommendations, the European Commission has emerged as an important agenda-setting force. Therefore, for different reasons, and through a very different process, Europe appears to be edging towards a more open immigration policy.
Table 1

Percentage of Respondents Who Claim There Are “Too Many Arabs in France”*#

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Immigr. In Commune/ Party ID</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>-1-4%</th>
<th>-5-10%</th>
<th>10%+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include smaller parties and non-identifiers
Source: CSA survey 9662093, November, 1996, Q5246/RS12/ETR

Table 2

The Motivations of Voters: 1984-97*
(Percentage of Party Voters Voting for These Reasons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%: -&gt;</th>
<th>Law and Order</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Social Inequality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rt</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
Circumscriptions in France (métro) with 10 percent + Immigrant Population (1999) by the Political Party of the député

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Paris (ville)</th>
<th>Banlieu de Paris</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Droite</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauche</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSEE Circonscriptions législatives: résultats du recensement de la population de mars 1999

Table 4
MPs Attitudes on Immigration and Repatriation in 1969 and 1982 (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1969: Britain must completely halt all coloured immigration, including dependents, and encourage the repatriation of coloured persons now living here.</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour MPs from high immigrant areas</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour MPs from low immigrant areas</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative MPs from high immigrant areas</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative MPs from low immigrant areas</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Robert C. Frasure, “Constituency Racial Composition and the Attitudes of British MPs,” Comparative Politics, Jan, 1971, p. 206
Table 5

British Local Authorities with 10 percent of more Non-white Population, by Political Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>London</th>
<th>Outside</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib-Dem</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17 (London +W. Midlands=69%)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*There was no reliable political data for 15 localities
Source: Census results for England, Scotland and Wales for 2001; results of elections for 1997, House of Commons: Total constituencies=630

Table 6

Opposition to Immigration in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953 %</th>
<th>1965 %</th>
<th>1977 %</th>
<th>1986 %</th>
<th>1993 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
<th>1999 %</th>
<th>2001 %</th>
<th>2001 %</th>
<th>2002 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Should immigration be decreased”</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Increased”</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Roper Poll, 1953; Gallup Poll: 1965-2002

Table 7


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York/Cal</th>
<th>Remainder of US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican CDs (50%+ 1998)</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic CDs (50%+ 1998)</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>69 (46%)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureau of the Census, Congressional District Data Book
CDs= 435
Endnotes

3 In fact, this is the core argument of Gary Freeman, in “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democracies,” in International Migration Review, 29, 1995, and Jeannette Money, in Fences and Neighbors, Ch. 1
5 The concept of arenas of power was first developed by EE Schnattschneider, in The Semi-sovereign People. Theodore Lowi, then applied it more extensively in The End of Liberalism (New York: WW Norton, 1969), Ch. 1
7 Vincent Viet, La France immigrée, p.509.
16 Money, Fences and Neighbors..., p. 80.
18Hansen, Citizenship and Migration..., pp. 136-141.

20Mink, Old Labor..., p.101
22Giddings was the author of an important sociology text, Principles of Sociology, first published in 1896. The text devoted relatively little space to questions of race, but where it did, it reflected the author’s somewhat ambivalent social Darwinism that emphasized the survival and dominance of "superior" white races. See Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 17-18.
23Higham, op. cit., p. 148.
30See Pierre Martin, “Qui vote pour le Front national français?” in Pascal Dlewit, Jean-Michel De Waele et Andrea Rea, L’Extrême droite en France et en Belgique (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1998), p. 154. Martin’s analysis is supported by Nonna Mayer’s work, where she argues that “...la présence de populations étrangères exerce un effet spécifique sur le vote FN, indépendant des caractéristiques sociales et culturelles de l’électeur. Mayer, Ces français qui votent FN, p. 258-259, and see Table 3.
Money, in *Fences and Neighbors*…, estimates that there were about 33 constituencies with 10% or more NCW immigrant and alien immigrants (p. 79).

Money, *Fences and Neighbors*…, p.85; Frasure, “Constituency Racial Composition…,” p. 203


This analysis is taken from Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, “From Ellis Island to LAX,” Department of Sociology, UCLA, August, 1993.

Two of the six congressional districts that are all or in part in Orange Country CA are solidly Democratic, with 60 percent or more of the vote in 2000 and 2002.


This analysis is taken from Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, “From Ellis Island to LAX,” Department of Sociology, UCLA, August, 1993.


See for example the failed trial balloon floated by Alain Juppé in October 1999: *Le Monde*, October 1, 1999.

For example, a widely publicized report of the French Economic and Social Council, supported by MEDEF—the French employers association— recommended that France “…open our frontiers to controlled immigration,” and estimated a need for an increase of 10 thousand foreigners per year. See *Le Monde*, November 8, 2003.